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The recent explosion in international trade and investment
has been accompanied by an increasing tendency in the busi-
ness world to choose arbitration as the mechanism for resolv-
ing international commercial disputes, principally because of
the greater assurance of neutrality offered by the arbitral fo-
rum as opposed to the national courts of either of the parties.'
A contemporary development caused by the onslaught of "un-
thinkable" economic change since the U.S. abandonment of the
gold standard in 1971 is the growth in the number of insolven-
cies among U.S. enterprises heavily involved in transnational
business.2 The coincident expansion in both the use of interna-
tional arbitration and the number of insolvencies among U.S.
companies doing business abroad will inevitably confront U.S.
courts with the problem of reconciling the conflicting principles
of U.S. bankruptcy law and the law of international arbitration.3
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law. The au-
thor wishes to express his great appreciation and admiration for the work done
on this Article by his research assistants, James McMichael, Paul Monroe, and
Joseph Halbach. He is also grateful for the helpful comments of Professors
Douglas Laycock, Hans Baade, Russell Weintraub and Douglas Whaley.
Many of the views expressed herein are based on the author's experience
in private practice from 1969-1979.
1. See generally Goekjian, The Conduct of International Arbitration, 11
LAw. AM. 409 (1979).
2. See, e.g., In re Itel Corp., 17 Bankr. 942 (9th Cir. 1982); In re White Mo-
tor Credit Corp., 11 Bankr. 294 (N.D. Ohio 1981); In re United Merchants &
Mfrs., Inc., 3 Bankr. 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). Foreign multinationals with U.S. assets
and creditors are experiencing increased insolvency rates as well. See Becker,
Transnational Insolvency Transformed, 29 Am. J. CoMP. L. 706, 706 (1981); Rie-
senfeld, Domestic Effects of Foreign Liquidation and Rehabilitation Proceed-
ings in the Light of Comparative Law, in FEsTscHmR GUmsiD KEG.L 433, 434
nn.6-7 (1977).
3. Although this Article discusses the effect of international arbitration
agreements in bankruptcy, the analysis might also be applicable to the resolu-
tion of many similar issues raised by domestic arbitration agreements. A sur-
vey of the cases involving domestic arbitration agreements illustrates that
there is no consensus concerning their effect in bankruptcy. Compare, e.g.,
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
In recognition of the increased use of arbitration agree-
ments in international commerce, the United Nations Confer-
ence on International Commercial Arbitration adopted the
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Ar-
bitral Awards on June 10, 1958.4 The United States acceded to
the Convention in 1970,5 and enacted implementing legislation
on July 31, 1970, as an amendment to the Federal Arbitration
Act (F.A.A.), designating new chapter 2 of the Act to deal with
recognition and enforcement of the Convention.6 According to
the Supreme Court, the goal of the Convention and the purpose
of the implementing legislation were "to encourage the recogni-
tion and enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements in
international contracts and to unify the standards by which
agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are
enforced in the signatory countries." 7
When a U.S. party enters into a transnational commercial
contract containing an international arbitration clause8 and
later becomes bankrupt before the contract is fully performed,
the principles reflected in the U.N. Convention are bound to
come into conflict with the contrary principles of the Bank-
ruptcy Code favoring consolidation of all claims against or on
behalf of the debtor in bankruptcy court.9 The U.S. bankAptcy
court must then determine the extent to which the arbitration
agreement or arbitral award is enforceable in the bankruptcy
proceeding.O It is the purpose of this Article to examine some
Barber-Greene Co. v. Zeco Co., 17 Bankr. 248, 249-50 (Bankr. Minn. 1982) (en-
forced domestic arbitration agreement against trustee) with In re Ludwig Ho-
nold Mfg. Co., 22 Bankr. 436, 438 (Bankr. ED. Pa. 1982) (declined enforcement).
4. U.N. Doc. E/Conf. 26/9/Rev. 1 (1958).
5. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, opened for signature June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, T.LA.S. No. 6997, 330
U.N.T.S. 3 (acceded to by U.S. Sept. 1, 1970; entered into force Dec. 29, 1970)
[hereinafter cited as U.N. Convention].
6. Act of July 31, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-368, 84 Stat. 692 (1970) (codified at 9
U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (1976)).
7. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
8. For present purposes, a "transnational commercial contract" involves
one or more parties whose principal place of business is located outside the
United States, and an "international arbitration agreement" is one which calls
for arbitration in a forum outside the United States, although both phrases are
routinely used differently and more broadly.
9. It is assumed in this Article that the debtor's principal place of busi-
ness and the largest part of its assets and liabilities are in the United States, so
that a sensible international conflicts rule would select U.S. law as controlling
the debtor's liquidation or rehabilitation. This Article does not attempt to ana-
lyze the numerous choice of law issues presented by the bankruptcy of a mul-
tinational entity nor the effect such an analysis might have upon the Article's
conclusions under various circumstances.
10. It seems settled that the trustee can insist on arbitration of claims on
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of the central issues that have already arisen or are likely to
arise in the future because of the conflict between the U.S.
commitment to international arbitration and U.S. bankruptcy
policy.
United States international arbitration policy is embodied
in the United Nations Convention, which applies to all foreign
arbitral awards." The F.AA. appears to treat all arbitration
agreements or arbitral awards as within the Convention's cov-
erage, unless the parties to the agreement or award are both
U.S. citizens and there is no "reasonable relation with one or
more foreign states.' 2 Each signatory state is required under
the Convention to "recognize" an arbitration agreement "con-
cerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitra-
tion,"1 3 and the F.A. empowers any U.S. district court to
"direct that arbitration be held in accordance with the agree-
ment at any place therein provided for."14 Similarly, the Con-
vention obligates signatory states to recognize arbitral awards
as binding and to enforce them according to legal rules of pro-
cedure which may not be substantially more onerous than
those applicable to enforcement of domestic arbitral awards.15
In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, Inc., 16 the Supreme Court declared
that international arbitration agreements are even more fa-
vored than domestic ones and are to be enforced as a matter of
overriding federal policy because of their importance to inter-
national commerce.17 Thus, one who seeks to enforce an inter-
national arbitration agreement or award in any context,
including bankruptcy, comes armed with a public policy both
well established and recently renewed.
The special characteristics of the Bankruptcy Code,18 on
the other hand, are exclusive jurisdiction by the bankruptcy
behalf of the bankrupt estate against a nonbankrupt party who had entered
into an arbitration agreement with the debtor. Schilling v. Canadian Foreign
S.S. Co., 190 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). See Kreindler, The Convergence of
Arbitration and Bankruptcy, 26 ARB. J. 34, 35 (1971).
11. U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. I, para. 1.
12. 9 U.S.C. § 202 (1976). See also infra note 31.
13. U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. II, para. 1.
14. 9 U.S.C. § 206 (1976).
15. U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. II. The FA.A provides a procedure
under which any party to the arbitration may, within three years of an arbitral
award covered by the Convention, apply to a U.S. district court for "an order
confirming the award as against any other party to the arbitration." 9 U.S.C.
§ 207 (1976).
16. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
17. Id. at 515-17.
18. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978)
(codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151326 (Supp. IV 1980)).
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court over all the property of the debtor and unified control
over all claims both by and against the debtor, whether in a liq-
uidation or rehabilitation proceeding.19  These features of
bankruptcy stem from the universal objective of bankruptcy
law-the orderly liquidation or rehabilitation of a debtor in
financial distress in a manner that maximizes payments to
creditors and ensures equality of distribution.
The objective of bankruptcy law is best served by vesting
total control of the debtor's affairs in the bankruptcy court.
Thus, the Code grants the bankruptcy courts original jurisdic-
tion over all "civil proceedings... arising in or related to cases
under [the Code] "20 and "exclusive jurisdiction of all of the
property, wherever located, of the debtor."21 This pervasive ju-
risdiction over claims liquidation is protected by section 362 of
the Code, which provides for an "automatic stay" or injunction
against nearly all efforts to prosecute or enforce claims against
a debtor or a debtor's property.22
Creditors who wish to share in the distribution of the bank-
rupt estate must assert their claims by filing a proof of claim in
19. The Code offers two types of relief to a financially distressed debtor. A
debtor may file for relief through liquidation under chapter 7 of the Code, in
which case the debtor's nonexempt assets are collected and sold, and the pro-
ceeds are distributed to creditors. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766 (Supp. IV 1980). On the
other hand, a debtor may fie for rehabilitation or reorganization under chap-
ters 11, or 13, the principal chapter for commercial purposes being chapter 11,
in which the debtor submits to the creditors a plan providing for the adjust-
ment of the debtor's debts and the repayment of creditors, usually from the fu-
ture income of the debtor's reconstituted business. Id. §§ 1101-1174.
In rehabilitation cases the debtor ordinarily remains in control of the es-
tate, and the debtor, in such cases, is referred to as a "debtor in possession" or
D.JP., who is subject to the same fiduciary obligations to creditors as a trustee
in a chapter 7 proceeding. This Article will refer only to the trustee, but unless
otherwise indicated the references to trustee also include a debtor in
possession.
20. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. IV 1980). In Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 102 S. Ct. 2858 (1982), the Supreme Court struck down
the broad jurisdictional grant of § 1471(b). It did not do so on any theory that
bankruptcy jurisdiction could not extend so far, but rather because Congress
had failed to provide judges appointed under article III of the Constitution to
exercise that jurisdiction. Id. at 2874. It seems that Congress may retain broad
bankruptcy jurisdiction by making bankruptcy judges article III judges or by
assigning the more expansive aspects of bankruptcy jurisdiction to the federal
district judges. See Circuit Council Admin. Order 123. (8th Cir. Dec. 15, 1982)
(on fle at tlie Minnesota Law Review). Although it is admittedly difficult to de-
termine the outer limits of the Court's ruling, there is no suggestion that the
injunctive powers of the bankruptcy court, including the automatic stay, are in-
valid. This Article discusses these powers, which lie at the heart of the bank-
ruptcy jurisdiction.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e) (Supp. IV 1980).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1) (Supp. V 1980).
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bankruptcy court.2 3 Claims disputed by the trustee or another
creditor are adjudicated by the bankruptcy court, the amount
of any judgment against the bankrupt estate becoming the "al-
lowed" claim of the victorious creditor.24 Allowed secured
claims receive a priority against the proceeds of the collateral,
with any shortfall being treated as an unsecured claim.25 Al-
lowed unsecured claims are paid pro rata since there are usu-
ally inadequate funds in the estate to pay all creditors in this
class in full.26 Because the percentage of claims recovered by
this class is typically very low, allowed unsecured claims can
be described as being paid in "bankruptcy dollars," dollars that
are worth much less than ordinary dollars. Expenses of admin-
istration, including postpetition operating costs, receive priority
under the Code and are usually paid in full, or in what can be
described as "administration (100 cents) dollars."27 Because of
the low percentage recovery on bankruptcy claims in general, it
is often not economical to engage in full scale litigation. For
this reason, bankruptcy procedures are designed to promote
relatively informal and expeditions resolution of claims.
Foreign arbitration proceedings are not subject to the auto-
matic stay of the bankruptcy court unless the foreign party to
the proceeding has sufficient contacts with the United States to
subject it to in personam jurisdiction in the United States. 28
23. Id. § 501.
24. Id. § 502(b).
25. Id. § 506.
26. Id. §726(a)(2).
27. Id. §§ 503(b) (1) (A), 507(a) (1).
28. See infra note 31 and accompanying text. A domestic arbitration is
subject to the automatic stay upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 11
U.S.C. § 362(a) (Supp. IV 1980). See also S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
50, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5787, 5836; -LI REP. No. 595,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 340 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
5963, 6297. Even prior to the adoption of the Code, it seemed clear that domes-
tic arbitrations were automatically stayed under the Bankruptcy Rules in pro-
ceedings under chapters X-XIL Fed. Bankr. R. 10-601(a); 11-44; 12-43; and
Advisory Committee's Notes. See 13A COLLR ON BA~NKuprcY T 10-601.01 (14th
ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER (14th)]. The leading bankruptcy trea-
tise maintained, however, that arbitrations were not stayed in Chapter VIII liq-
uidations. 1A COLLIER (14th), supra, 11.03. No explanation was given for the
different treatment of liquidation in this regard, and no policy reason is evident.
The distinction could not have been based on the relevant sections of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, all of which spoke only of "suits." See Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575,
30 Stat. 840, §§ 11, 314, 414, 614 (repealed 1978). Cf. id. § 2(a) (15) (repealed 1978)
(allowing judges to issue injunctions restraining courts if necessary for the en-
forcement of the Act). It is also interesting that neither the commission bill,
which was the basis for the new Code, nor the commission's notes included ar-
bitration within the stay. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess. § 362 (1978) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Commission Bill]; REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTcY
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This Article seeks to reconcile the conflicting bankruptcy and
international arbitration policies with respect to international
arbitral awards rendered in proceedings not subject to the au-
tomatic stay because the foreign party is not within the inper-
sonam jurisdiction of the United States. Part II of the Article
discusses the effect postpetition international arbitral awards
should have in U.S. bankruptcy proceedings. It argues that
conclusive effect should be denied such awards unless the for-
eign party has received the bankruptcy court's prior approval
to liquidate the claim in arbitration pursuant to the parties'
contract or agreement. Part I explores the limits of the bank-
ruptcy court's discretion in determining whether to recognize
or refuse to recognize the parties' arbitration agreement in the
exercise of its approval power. Finally, Part IV examines the
extent to which prepetition international arbitral awards
against the debtor should be given effect in the bankruptcy pro-
ceedings of the debtor.
H. EFFECT OF POSTPETJTION ARBITRAL AWARDS IN
BANKRUPTCY
The automatic stay of the bankruptcy court is enforced
through the bankruptcy court's power to impose a contempt
sanction against a recalcitrant creditor who proceeds notwith-
standing the stay.29 Any postpetition proceeding stayed by the
bankruptcy order is simply void, and any judgment rendered in
a stayed proceeding is subject to collateral attack in bank-
ruptcy.30 It is reasonably clear that any postpetition domestic
arbitral award would be void in bankruptcy by operation of the
automatic stay.
The situation with respect to postpetition international ar-
bitral awards is different. Foreign proceedings are not within
LAws OF THE UNirED STATES, H.R. Doc. No. 137, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. pt. H at 117-
23 (1975) [hereinafter cited as COMMISSION REPORT].
29. See, e.g., Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d
47, 52-53 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1093 (1977); Preferred Surfacing,
Inc. v. Gwinnet Bank & Trust Co., 400 F. Supp. 280, 284-85 (N.D. Ga. 1975); In re
Reed, 11 Bankr. 258, 261-62 (Bankr. Utah 1981); Edwards v. Pullman Trailmobile,
5 Bankr. 663, 665 (M.D. Ala. 1980); Coleman Am. Cas. v. Littleton Natl Bank, 8
Bankr. 384, 387 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1981). See also Commission Bill, supra note 28;
Kennedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 11 U. MicH J. REF. 177, 259-66
(1978) [hereinafter cited as Automatic Stay Part I]. But see Hatcher v. Mid-
American Acceptance Corp., 14 Bankr. 757, 759 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1981).
30. See, e.g., Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 438-39 (1940); Potts v. Pctts,
142 F.2d 883, 888 (6th Cir. 1950); In re Kaid, 347 F. Supp. 540, 543 (E.D. Va. 1972);




the territorial jurisdiction of the United States and are thus not
subject to the automatic stay of the bankruptcy court.3 1 Conse-
quently, an international arbitration proceeding commenced in
a foreign country by a party not subject to the in personam ju-
risdiction of the U.S. courts may go forward notwithstanding
the filing of a petition in U.S. bankruptcy court by another
party to the arbitration proceeding. Thus, the U.S. bankruptcy
courts must determine what effect to give such postpetition in-
ternational arbitral awards.
31. If the United States is the forum for the arbitration, it is clear that the
U.S. courts would have the power to stay the proceeding. RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNTrED STATES § 17(a) (1965). For
most purposes the law of the place of arbitration controls the proceeding. See
U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. I, paras. 1, 3(1), (3), art. V, para. 1(a), (d),
(e). See generally Goekjian, supra note 1, at 411-13. But see, e.g., Societe
AKSA, SA. v. Societe NORSOLOR, SA., Cour d'appel de Paris, Dec. 9, 1980, re-
printed in 20 IL.M. 887 (1981).
There is no indication that Congress intended to exempt transnational ar-
bitrations taking place in this country from the operation of the automatic stay.
If the nullification rule discussed in this Article is applied to international arbi-
tration, then afortiori the stay should be applied to all U.S. based arbitrations.
See infra text accompanying notes 41-55.
More difficult questions are presented if the arbitration is to be held
outside the United States. If the foreign party had sufficient contacts with the
United States to make it subject to suit here absent the arbitration clause, then
a good case can be made that the foreign party is subject to the automatic stay
and may not proceed with the arbitration. In that situation the trustee could
sue the foreign party in the bankruptcy court and obtain an injunction against
further arbitration. See 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (Supp. IV 1980); 28 U.S.C. § 1471(c)
(Supp. IV 1980). Since the automatic stay was designed to eliminate the re-
quirement for a specific stay in each case, it should generally apply whenever a
specific stay would be routinely granted, absent a statutory exception. Cf. Ken-
nedy, The Automatic Stay in Bankruptcy, 12 U. MicH. J.L REF. 3, 62 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Automatic Stay Part 11] ("automatic stays ... have
tended merely to replace stays ordered by courts on applications filed by peti-
tioners"). On the other hand, if the foreign party had only minimum contacts
with regard to some transaction unrelated to the arbitration agreement, the
trustee would not be able to get personal jurisdiction over the foreign party,
and presumably the automatic stay would not and could not apply. But see In
re W&G Dev. A.G., 3 BANKE. CT. DEC. (CRR) 655 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1977).
For a discussion of the interesting related problem of determining whether
an arbitration is "domestic" so as to be outside the coverage of the U.N. Con-
vention, see McMahon, Implementation of the United Nations Convention on
Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States, 2 J. MAI. L. & COM. 735, 741-42
n.29 (1971). See also Domke, The United States Implementation of the United
Nations Arbitral Convention, 19 Am. J.CoMP. I. 575, 577 (1971); Paulsson, The
Role of the Swedish Cburts in Transnational Commercial Arbitration, 21 VA. J.
INT'L L. 211, 230-35 (1977). At least one case has articulated a liberal standard
for finding an arbitration covered by the Convention (and therefore not "do-
mestic" for coverage purposes). See Fuller Co. v. Compagne Des Bauxites De
Guinee, 421 F. Supp. 938, 941 (W.D. Pa. 1976).
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A. FOTOCHROME AND THE NULLIFICATION RULE
In Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 32 the Second Circuit de-
cided the effect in bankruptcy of a foreign arbitral award ren-
dered after the filing of a bankruptcy petition. That case
presented the court with an arbitration clause in a distribution
contract between Fotochrome, a domestic corporation located
in New York, and Copal, a Japanese camera maker, under
which Fotochrome agreed to distribute in the United States
cameras manufactured by Copal. When a dispute broke out in
which each party accused the other of violating the agreement,
Copal initiated arbitration proceedings in Japan as called for by
the arbitration clause. Before the arbitration proceeding could
be completed, Fotochrome filed for an arrangement under
Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act.33 The bankruptcy court is-
sued a restraining order staying any arbitration involving
Fotochrome, and the latter notified the Japanese arbitral tribu-
nal that a petition had been filed and a stay had been entered.
The arbitral tribunal determined that it was not bound by the
stay and proceeded to issue an arbitral award in favor of Copal
for over $600,000. Upon receiving the arbitral award, Copal im-
mediately reduced the award to judgment in Japan and filed a
proof of claim in the bankruptcy court. The referee in the
bankruptcy ruled that the restraining order of the bankruptcy
court operated to stay the arbitration proceeding and that the
bankruptcy court could therefore relitigate the merits of Co-
pal's claim.34
The district court reversed the bankruptcy referee 35 and
the Second Circuit affirmed. The latter's precise holding was
that a foreign arbitral award commenced prior to the filing of a
32. 517 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1975).
33. Chapter XI under the Bankruptcy Act was basically similar to chapter
11 under the Code insofar as is relevant here.
34. The bankruptcy court had found the Convention inapplicable, since
U.S. accession post-dated the petition in bankruptcy. [1973-1975 Transfer
Binder] BANK L. REP. (CCH) 64,987 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1973) (summary). The
Second Circuit panel held that the Convention applied retroactively. 517 F.2d
at 515, n.3. Accord Fertilizer Corp. v. IDI Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948,
951-52 (S.D. Ohio 1981). The Supreme Court in Scherk did not feel compelled
to decide this issue. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver, 417 U.S. 506, 520 n.15 (1974).
35. In re Fotochrome, 377 F. Supp. 26, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 1974). In the district
court the potential conflict between the U.N. Convention and the Bankruptcy
Act was resolved by the rule that the later in time should prevail. Id. See Com-
ment, International Arbitration-Bankruptcy-The Impact of the U.N. Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards on the
U.S. Bankruptcy Act 1 INr'L TRADE L.J. 263, 268 (1976). Presumably, the subse-
quent adoption of the Code would now require a reversal of the result, illustrat-
ing the defect in the "last in time" approach.
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bankruptcy petition and not subject to the bankruptcy court's
automatic stay because of a lack of personal jurisdiction over
the nonbankrupt party is a provable debt in bankruptcy if re-
duced to judgment in the United States. The Second Circuit
found that because the bankruptcy court lacked personal juris-
diction over Copal, which did not have the required minimum
contacts with the United States, the stay "did not operate
against Copal."3 6 The court directed Copal to seek confirma-
tion of the award in U.S. district court, affording Fotochrome an
opportunity to raise any of the defenses permitted under the
Convention,3 7 as a condition to giving the award binding effect
in bankruptcy.38
36. 517 F.2d at 516.
37. Article V of the Convention specifies seven grounds upon which a state
in which enforcement is sought may refuse to recognize and enforce an arbitral
award. Two of the seven grounds are assertible by the forum state on its own
motion. See infra text accompanying notes 143-47. The Fotochrome court held
that Fotochrome would have the right to assert any of these defenses against
the enforceability of the award in the proceeding to confirm the award. 517 F.2d
at 519. The court relied on the F.A.A. which provides for confirmation of inter-
national arbitral awards in a U.S. district court "unless it finds one of the
grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award spec-
ified in the said Convention." 9 U.S.C. § 207 (1976).
38. 517 F.2d at 520. The court seemed to take comfort from the fact that
Fotochrome could defend against enforcement of the award under article
V(1) (b) of the Convention on the ground that it had been "otherwise unable to
present [its] case". Id. at 518. It seems clear that this defense contemplates
procedural unfairness in the arbitration, not problems caused by the confusion
of the debtor's affairs attendant upon bankruptcy. See, e.g., Parsons and Whit-
temore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de LIndustrie Du Papier, 508 F.2d 969,
975 (2d Cir. 1974) (inability to present certain witnesses does not amount to de-
nial of opportunity to present case); Judgement of June 3, 1971, Obergericht of
Basle, Swizt., summarized in 1979 Y.B. CoM. ARB. 309 (refusal to grant exten-
sion because of firm director's compulsory military service does not amount to
denial). Cf. Biotronik Mess-und Therapiegeraete GmbH & Co. v. Medford Med-
ical Instrument Co., 415 F. Supp. 133, 137-38 (D.N.J. 1976) (enforcement of ad-
verse foreign arbitration award cannot be avoided on theory that foreign party
perpetrated fraud when it appeared alone at arbitration hearing). See also
Comment, Chapter XI Jurisdiction Over Foreign Arbitral Awards, 42 BROOK-
LYN L. REv. 726, 759-60 n.97 (1976). See generally B. Harrell, Case Law Constru-
ing the Exceptions to the Enforcement of Foreign Awards Under the New York
Convention 25-27 (December 1, 1980) (unpublished manuscript) (on file at the
Minnesota Law Review).
The Fotochrome court had to reach to permit Fotochrome to assert the
Convention's defenses in the U.S., since Copal had previously obtained a Japa-
nese judgment on the award. The court held that the Japanese judgment was
not itself enforceable under New York law. 517 F.2d at 518-19. If the judgment
had been enforced, Fotochrome would have been precluded from asserting the
Convention's defenses in the U.S. confirmation proceeding under the doctrine
of res judicata. That the court's conclusion makes no sense may explain why
no authority is cited in support of it. It is also directly contrary to prior author-
ity in the Second Circuit. See, e.g., Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron De-
vices, 489 F.2d 1313, 1318-19 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974). See
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The Fotochrome opinion 39 unfortunately ignored the pre-
Code bankruptcy precedent reflecting the importance of cen-
tralized claims control in the bankruptcy court in its effort to
vindicate enforcement of the U.N. Convention. Because the
Fotochrome court did not recognize this important bankruptcy
policy, it was left with nothing against which to balance the
powerful federal policy favoring enforcement of international
arbitral awards reflected in the 1970 amendments to the Fed-
eral Arbitration Act.40
The automatic stay in bankruptcy is a relatively recent de-
velopment. In the past, the bankruptcy court issued stays only
with respect to specific pending or threatened proceedings. A
nonbankruptcy proceeding against the debtor often continued
after the filing of a petition in bankruptcy either because the
trustee did not choose to stay it or because the trustee was
simply unaware of it. Thus, bankruptcy courts were called
upon to determine the effect in bankruptcy of a postpetition
judgment or award entered against a debtor in an unstayed
proceeding.
Although there is little authority regarding the effect of un-
stayed postpetition domestic arbitration awards obtained with-
out bankruptcy court approval,4 1 there have been a number of
cases in which courts were required to decide the effect in
bankruptcy of nonbankruptcy court judgments entered against
a debtor after bankruptcy. The early decisions made such judg-
ments conclusive,42 but the more modern cases, and the com-
also N.Y. Crv. PRAc. LAw § 5302 (McKinney 1978) (Foreign Money Judgment
Act); Comment, supra, at 738-41.
39. The Fotochrome opinion was greeted with general acclaim in the law
reviews. See, e.g., Note, Judicial Interpretations of Foreign Arbitral Awards
Under the U.N. Convention, 8 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 737, 752 (1976); Comment,
supra note 38, at 743; Comment, Bankruptcy-International Arbitration-A
Foreign Arbitral Award Rendered After the Filing of a Chapter XI Bankruptcy
Petition and Filed as a Proof of Claim Is Valid and Unreviewable on the Mer-
its, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 216, 224 (1975). But see, e.g., Comment, International Arbi-
tration-Bankruptcy-U.N. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of
Foreign Arbitral Awards Makes Foreign Award a Provable Claim When Bank-
ruptcy Court Has No Jurisdiction to Enjoin Foreign Arbitration Proceeding, 9
VAwD. J. TRANSNAT'IL L 187, 198 (1975).
40. The Second Circuit relied primarily on an equity reorganization case,
Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218 (1929) for bankruptcy policy. 517 F.2d at 517.
The district court seemed more concerned with bankruptcy policy, but failed to
develop or analyze it. 377 F. Supp. at 28-29.
41. See, e.g., Taylor v. Brodt, 396 N.Y.S.2d 143, 144 (1977) (confirmation of
award denied because of bankruptcy stay); In re Markowitz Co., 6 Am. Bankr.
Rep. (N.S.) 221, 222 (Ref. S.D.N.Y. 1925) (dicta suggesting award not necessarily
conclusive); supra note 3.
42. The reasoning of these cases was that the failure to stay the nonbank-
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mentators, support a rule voiding postpetition judgments for
bankruptcy purposes, even though the proceeding in which the
judgment was entered had not been subjected to a bankruptcy
stay.43 Under the modern rule, the underlying merits of a cred-
itor's claim remain subject to relitigation in full in bankruptcy
notwithstanding a prior judgment if that judgment was ob-
tained after the debtor filed a petition in bankruptcy.
44
The conceptual basis for what this Article will call the "nul-
lification" rule rests on the traditional idea that upon bank-
ruptcy all the debtor's assets pass to a distinct legal entity, the
bankrupt estate, burdened only by those liabilities extant on
the date of bankruptcy.45 It follows that any pending litigation
to which the estate's representative is not a party should not
ruptcy proceeding constituted an election by the trustee to permit liquidation
of the creditor's claim in that proceeding, rather than in the bankruptcy court.
See, e.g., Hill v. Harding, 107 U.S. 631, 633 (1882); Norton v. Switzer, 93 U.S. 355,
362-63 (1876) (bankruptcy trustee "silently acquiesced"); Eyster v. Gaff, 91 U.S.
521, 524 (1875); Doe v. Childress, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 642, 647 (1874); cf. Boynton v.
Ball, 121 U.S. 457, 467-68 (1887) (final discharge not obtained until after judg-
ment rendered in state court).
Section 63(a) (5) of the 1898 Act made postpetition judgments "provable" in
bankruptcy and could have been taken as codifying the cases cited above. See
United States v. Paddock, 180 F.2d 121, 124 (5th Cir. 1950); In re Anton, 11 F.
Supp. 345, 346 (D. Minn. 1935). In fact it appears that § 63(a) (5) was included
for a different purpose: to ensure that postpetition judgments based on prepeti-
tion claims would be discharged. See In re Pinkel, 1 An. Bankr. Rep. 333, 339
(Ref. N.D.N.Y. 1899); 1 H. REMINGTON, BANKRUPTCY LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 695 (1908).
43. See, e.g., Marks v. Brucker, 434 F.2d 897, 900-01 (9th Cir. 1970); Coleman
v. Alcock, 272 F.2d 618, 621-22 (5th Cir. 1959); In re Paramount Publix Corp., 85
F.2d 42, 43 (2d Cir. 1936); In re Continental Engine Co., 234 F. 58, 60 (7th Cir.
1916); In re Barrett & Co., 27 F.2d 159, 160-61 (S.D. Ga.), affd sub nom. Rhodes v.
Elliston, 29 F.2d 737, 738 (5th Cir. 1928); In re Hoey, Tilden & Co., 292 F. 269, 272
(S.D.N.Y. 1922). Contra United States v. Paddock, 178 F.2d 394, 399 (5th Cir.
1949), reh'g denied, 180 F.2d 121 (5th Cir. 1950); In re Anton, 11 F. Supp. 345, 346-
47 (D. Minn. 1935); In re Buchan's Soap Corp., 169 F. 1017, 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1909);
cf. Heiser v. Woodruff 327 U.S. 726, 728 (1946) (allowance of claim based upon
money judgment acquired against bankrupt before bankruptcy); Straton v.
New, 283 U.S. 318, 326 (1931) (where judgment constituting lien on debtor's real
estate is recovered more than four months prior to filing petition, bankruptcy
court is without jurisdiction to enjoin prosecution of creditor's action); Doyle v.
Nemerov's Executors, 223 F.2d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 1955) (state court order awarding
allowances to attorneys was res judicata in subsequent bankruptcy proceeding
where petition was not approved until after order was issued).
44. The Collier treatise favors the rule stated in the text. See IA COLLIER
(14th), supra note 28, 1 11.09, 3 COLLIER (14th), supra note 28, 57.15 n.48; 3A
COLL R (14th), supra note 28, T 63.01 nn.9-12, 1 63.27. See also J. Moore, Res
Judicata and Collateral Estoppel in Bankruptcy, 68 YALE L.J. 1, 50 nn.236-38
(1958).
45. See, e.g., Brotherhood of Ry. Employees v. REA Express, 523 F.2d 164,
170 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1976). But see In re Unishops, 543
F.2d 1017, 1018 (2d Cir. 1976).
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bind the estate.46 The policy reason for the modern rule is the
overriding importance of centralized control over all claims
against the debtor in order to protect the debtor's creditors
from spurious or inflated claims against the estate.
Judge Learned Hand adopted this rationale for the nullifi-
cation rule in In re Paramount Publix Corp..47 This is a case
presenting the ideal circumstance for applying the rule since
the claim being asserted was based on a postpetition judgment
apparently obtained by default and patently for an inflated
amount. In holding that a judgment obtained after the filing of
a bankruptcy petition does not liquidate a claim for bankruptcy
purposes, Judge Hand emphasized that if the judgment were
given binding effect "the result [would be] to introduce among
[other creditors] an unwarranted, or overblown, claim which
they have never had any chance to contest."48
46. In re Barrett & Co., 27 F.2d 159, 161-62 (S.D. Ga.), afd sub nom. Rhodes
v. Elliston, 29 F.2d 737 (5th Cir. 1928); In re Hoey, Tilden & Co., 292 F. 269, 271
(S.D.N.Y. 1922). See 3A COLLIER (14th), supra note 28, 63.27.
47. 85 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1936). In rejecting the earlier cases and adopting the
nullification rule, the courts felt aided by some new language added in the 1898
Act. Upon careful comparison of the 1867 and 1898 Acts, these arguments may
have raised as many questions as they answered. Compare In re Paramount
Publix, 85 F.2d at 44-45 with Norton v. Switzer 93 U.S. 355, 362-63 (1876).
48. 85 F.2d at 44. The cases contrary to the nullification rule are not per-
suasive. Two of the older cases gave conclusive effect to postpetition proceed-
ings merely on the basis of the 1867 Act cases. See In re Anton, 11 F. Supp. 345,
346-47 (D. Minn. 1935); In re Buchanan's Soap Corp., 169 F. 1017, 1018 (S.D.N.Y.
1909). United States v. Paddock, 178 F.2d 394, 399 (5th Cir. 1950), held a govern-
ment Renegotiation Act decision valid and conclusive against the debtor even
though the debtor had entered reorganization during the Renegotiation Act
proceeding. The court cited in support of its decision In re Barrett & Co., 27
F.2d 159 (S.D. Ga.), affid sub nom. Rhodes v. Elliston, 29 F.2d 733 (5th Cir. 1928),
a decision generally cited in support of the nullification rule. When the trustee
in Paddock sought rehearing, the court tried to distinguish Barrett by saying
that the nullification rule was Barrett's alternative holding and thus mere dic-
tum in the case. United States v. Paddock, 180 F.2d 121, 123-24 (5th Cir. 1950).
This reading of Barrett is directly contradicted by the Fifth Circuit's affirmance
of Barrett specifically on the basis of the two-entity rationale of the nullification
rule. 29 F.2d at 738.
Paradise v. Vogtlandische Machienen-Fabrik, 99 F.2d 53 (3rd Cir. 1938), in-
volved an attempt by defendants who lost a patent case to avoid the result by
asserting the plaintiff's bankruptcy during the patent proceeding. The court
held that the plaintiff's trustee in bankruptcy knew and approved of the suit
and thus would be bound by it. Id. at 55. It should be noted that the patent
case had been tried and decided before bankruptcy. Only the actual entry of
judgment took place during the pendency of bankruptcy proceedings.
In re Falsone, 247 F. 607 (S.D. Fla. 1917) was a case where the trustee was
actually a party to the nonbankruptcy proceeding. Similarly, in Heiser v.
Woodruff, 327 U.S. 726 (1946), the trustee intervened in the state suit after de-
fault, sought to reopen the case on state grounds, and then took an appeal,
which he lost. Straten v. New, 283 U.S. 318 (1931), might be understood, in mod-
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In re Paramount illustrates the evil that the nullification
rule is designed to prevent-the reduction of the bankrupt es-
tate by merit-foreclosing judgments obtained by default or
quasi-default during the pendency of the bankruptcy proceed-
ing. Many debtors enter bankruptcy surrounded by pending or
threatened lawsuits, actions which may even have precipitated
the debtor's bankruptcy. The nullification rule-whether stand-
ing alone or applied by way of the automatic stay-ensures that
the trustee in bankruptcy will have an opportunity to learn
about these suits and settle or defend them on the merits.
"Breathing room" of this sort is equally necessary in a chapter
11 proceeding, since law suits are often neglected in the
debtor's prepetition financial frenzy, a frenzy which typically
continues through the early stages of the rehabilitation effort.
The nullification rule assures the debtor's creditors that the
merits of suits against the debtor will not be improperly re-
solved, and the bankrupt estate unnecessarily diminished, be-
cause of the lack of a vigorous defense.
Although the nullification rule was not immediately and
universally accepted,49 any question about its validity today
ern terms, on the ground that the property at issue was no longer property of
the estate, and therefore the state lien enforcement action could continue.
49. Justice Brandeis squarely rejected the rule in Riehle v. Margolies, 279
U.S. 218 (1929). At issue in Riehle was the finality of a state court judgment in a
federal equity receivership, as opposed to a bankruptcy proceeding. In receiv-
erships an anti-injunction statute, Act of Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 265, 36 Stat. 1162
(current version at 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976)) prevented the staying of state court
proceedings against the receivership debtor. The legal analysis in Riehie
turned on that statute, which did not, and still does not, apply in bankruptcy.
279 U.S. at 223. See IA COLLR (14th), supra note 28, T 11.09. Nonetheless, Jus-
tice Brandeis took the occasion to reject explicitly the notion that claims liqui-
dation should be closely controlled by a court having jurisdiction over the
property to be distributed. 279 U.S. at 222-24, 228 n.4. The occasion was
presented by the sharply opposing views on this point taken by the three differ-
ent Second Circuit panels which had heard three appeals in Riehle. See Hatch
v. Morosco Holding Co., 5 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir. 1925) (Hough, Manton & L. Hand,
JJ.); second appeal, 19 F.2d 766 (2d Cir. 1927) (Hough, Manton & Swan, JJ.);
third appeal, 26 F.2d 247 (2d Cir. 1928) (L. Hand, A. Hand & Swan, JJ.). Not sur-
prisingly, the two panels which included Judge Learned Hand (the first and
third) took the view that the results in the state court proceedings were not
binding in the receivership, while the second panel, on which he did not sit,
came to the contrary conclusion. On the third appeal, the panel, per curiam,
felt required to affirm the conclusive effect of the state judgment, because the
second panel had made this result "the law of the case." 26 F.2d at 247. The
third panel then proceeded to invite reversal by the Supreme Court based
upon the panel's conviction that claims control should rest with the receiver-
ship court Id. The Supreme Court took the case, but affirmed, adopting the
policy rationale of the second panel One assumes this whole disorderly epi-
sode was an embarrassment to a singularly distinguished circuit court and es-
pecially to one of its most distinguished members, Learned Hand. See
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seems to have been resolved in favor of the rule by the devel-
opment of the pervasive automatic stay.0 The modern stay is
based on the conviction that the bankruptcy court must exert
total control over the liquidation of claims.5 1 In most cases the
stay itself nullifies any unapproved postpetition proceeding.
generally Moore & Oglebay, The Supreme Cour4 Stare Decisis, and the Law of
the Case, 21 TEx. L. REV. 514, 544-47 (1943).
Seven years later Judge Learned Hand in Paramount rejected the applica-
tion of Riehle to bankruptcy. 85 F.2d at 43. His view ultimately became the
dominant one in the relatively few cases in which bankruptcy stays did not
moot the question altogether.
The curious coda to this story is found in Doyle v. Nemerov's Executors,
223 F.2d 54 (2d Cir. 1955), an opinion written by Learned Hand. The result is
not inconsistent with the nullification rule, but the reasoning is. In Doyle,
Judge Hand relied on Riehle for the proposition that a postpetition state judg-
ment may be valid in bankruptcy. 223 F.2d at 56 n.2. The opinion suggests that
liquidation of a claim against a debtor in a nonbankruptcy forum is perfectly
satisfactory. This conclusion is startling coming from the same jurist who
wrote eloquently twenty-four years earlier about the danger to other creditors
posed by nonbankruptcy litigation against a reorganizing debtor. Compare In
re Paramount Publix Corp., 85 F.2d at 43-44 (where creditors must abate their
claims, the result is an unwarranted or overblown claim which they did not
have an opportunity to contest) with Doyle v. Nemerov's Executors, 223 F.2d at
57 ("There is no reason to suppose that state courts will not as satisfactorily
liquidate existing claims in personam in reorganization as they will in bank-
ruptcy.") A comment on the Doyle case found the result to be correct, but only
if the court retained discretion to reopen the merits in order to protect other
creditors. Comment, Bankruptcy-Corporate Reorganization-Merits of Allow-
ance of Fees by State Court After Filing but Prior to Approval of Involuntary
Petition for Reorganization May Not Be Reexamined by Reorganization Court
69 HARv. L. REv. 754, 756 (1956).
50. H.R. REP., supra note 28, at 340-41, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at
6296-97. Compare Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550
F.2d at 53, 57 (stay necessary to centralize claims) and Bohack v. Borden, Inc.,
599 F.2d 1160, 1167 (2d Cir. 1979) (same) with In re Barrett & Co., 27 F.2d at 161
(nullification rule important so that all claims are determined in bankruptcy
court).
51. The protection of creditors against unjustified claims is not often sin-
gled out as a function of the automatic stay, although it is central to the ration-
ale for the nullification rule. On the other hand, the "centralization" of the
claims process must have such a purpose, along with expedition and reduction
of expense. See Fidelity Mortgage Investors v. Camelia Builders, Inc., 550 F.2d
47, 56-57 (2d Cir. 1976); Bohack v. Borden, Inc., 599 F.2d 1160, 1167 (2d Cir. 1979).
See also 2 H. REMINGTON, supra note 42, § 2690; of. 1 H. REMINGTON, supra note
42, § 1647 ("occasion will arise when it will be to the creditors' interest to have
the trustee defend even a suit merely in personam"); Automatic Stay Part I,
supra note 29, at 185 n.43 (bankrupt who did not obtain injunctive relief from
bankruptcy court had to pursue his remedy to U.S. Supreme Court before
finally getting relief); Automatic Stay Part II, supra note 31, at 61, 62 (auto-
matic stays have dual purpose of enabling debtors to obtain fresh starts and of
protecting creditors).
It may be that the existence of the nullification rule minimized focus upon
creditor protection in the analysis of stays, just as the increasingly pervasive




Where it does not, the policy of bankruptcy control over the liq-
uidation of claims against the bankrupt can be vindicated by
the application of the nullification rule, including its application
to foreign arbitral awards otherwise required to be recognized
under the U.N. Convention.5 2
The Fotochrome case itself suggests the prejudice that can
result from failure to apply the rule. At the time of
Fotochrome's bankruptcy petition, Copal had completed its
case in the arbitration proceeding, but Fotochrome had not yet
offered its witnesses or other evidence.53 Although Fotochrome
originally intended to call two witnesses, it never produced
them; the arbitral tribunal eventually ruled in favor of Copal
without ever hearing Fotochrome's evidence. While a two-en-
try witness list suggests that Fotochrome's case may have been
insubstantial, such an inference is by no means compelled. Ex-
perience with prebankruptcy debtors teaches that the debtor's
defense may simply have lacked sufficient resources, both in
terms of money and time.54 The debtor's postbankruptcy asser-
tion of its right to defend and counterclaim against Copal sug-
gests it believed it could defeat, or at least substantially reduce,
Copal's claim. If the testing process of full litigation in bank-
ruptcy would have reduced or eliminated Copal's claim, then
the foreclosure of relitigation cost the debtor's other creditors
dearly. Only in the largest of bankruptcies would a $600,000
claim not seriously dilute the recoveries of other creditors.5
52. The rationale for the nullification rule is strengthened in the context of
a foreign proceeding. The principal cases opposing the rule turned in signifi-
cant part upon the notion that the failure to impose a stay gives rise to an infer-
ence that the unstayed proceedings were intended to have effect. See, e.g.,
Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218, 223 (1929); Norton v. Switzer, 93 U.S. 355, 361-62
(1876). That argument, however, does not apply in the case of foreign arbitra-
tion proceedings. Congress has not deliberately chosen to exempt foreign pro-
ceedings from the operation of the stay, because Congress lacked the power to
make the stay reach so far even if it had wanted to. See supra note 31 and ac-
companying text.
53. Although the district court opinion suggests that the proceedings were
completed, 377 F. Supp. at 28, the more detailed statement in the Second Cir-
cuit opinion indicates that Fotochrome had not yet presented its case, 517 F.2d
at 514.
54. Fotochrome three times failed to appear to present its witnesses dur-
ing the last months before bankruptcy. 517 F.2d at 514. While this manner of
(not) proceeding is deplorable and while some solvent parties to arbitrations
are guilty of no less, these facts are also consistent with the possibility of sheer
neglect of this distant, expensive proceeding by a management sliding into
bankruptcy.
55. It is also possible that full litigation might have produced an affirmative
recovery for the debtor on its $800,000 counterclaim, in which case the preclu-
sion of relitigation cost the other creditors more dearly still.
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It is clear that bankruptcy policy would be better served by
the adoption of a rule nullifying for bankruptcy purposes any
postbankruptcy arbitration award, regardless of the applicabil-
ity of the automatic stay to such arbitration proceedings. Next,
one must consider the effect of the powerful U.S. policies favor-
ing the enforcement of international arbitration agreements
and arbitral awards.
B. THE U.N. CONVENTION AND U.S. POLICIES FAVORING
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS
There are three possible grounds for not applying the nulli-
fication rule to foreign arbitral awards: 1) U.S. courts should
not attempt to use local law to control foreign proceedings;
2) the U.N. Convention and the implementing law require U.S.
courts to enforce arbitral awards covered by the Convention;
and 3) the strong federal policy favoring enforcement of foreign
arbitral awards should prevail over the conflicting bankruptcy
policy reflected in the nullification rule.
1. Lack of Jurisdiction
One argument for exempting foreign arbitral awards from
the nullification rule might rely on the apparent anomaly cre-
ated by denying effect to a proceeding which U.S. courts are
powerless to control.56 The lack of personal jurisdiction over a
foreign party admittedly prevents U.S. courts from controlling a
foreign party's conduct overseas, and the lack of territorial ju-
risdiction over foreign tribunals prevents U.S. courts from con-
trolling the effect given an arbitral award against the non-U.S.
assets of a U.S. bankrupt. Yet, these effects stemming from the
absence of personal and extra-territorial jurisdiction should not
end the inquiry into the scope of U.S. jurisdiction. The source
of the bankruptcy court's power is its exclusive in rem jurisdic-
tion over all the U.S. assets of the bankrupt. 7 This jurisdiction
gives the bankruptcy court the power to deny effect "defen-
--- ively" to that which it lacks the power to prevent or undo "of-
fensively." Two examples of the bankruptcy court's power in
56. Such an argument would no doubt begin with the doctrine that Con-
gress is presumed to have intended to regulate only domestic matters unless it
explicitly states its intention to the contrary. RESTATEMENT, supra note 31, § 38.
But see RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(4)
and comment f (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1981) [hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT, RE-
VISED]. See also RESTATEMENT, supra note 31, § 17(b); RESTATEMENT, REVISED,
supra, § 402(1) (b).
57. See supra note 21, and accompanying text.
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this regard are found in the areas of voidable transfers and for-
eign distributions.
Under the former Bankruptcy Act, the avoidance of voida-
ble transfers was generally outside the summary jurisdiction of
the bankruptcy court. Section 502(d) of the Bankruptcy Code58
provides that "the court shall disallow any claim of any entity
... that is a transferee of a transfer avoidable under [the
Code], unless such entity or transferee has paid the amount, or
turned over any such property, for which such entity or trans-
feree is liable . . . ."59 The equivalent provision in the old
Bankruptcy Act in effect enabled the bankruptcy court to act
against voidable transfers "defensively," by claim denial, al-
though it lacked the power to void these same transfers "offen-
sively." The trustee in bankruptcy was required to bring an
avoidance action in some nonbankruptcy court.60 For example,
if a creditor who had received a preference was prepared to
forgo a bankruptcy claim, it could enjoy the fruits of its prefer-
ence unless the trustee could get jurisdiction over the preferred
creditor in some nonbankruptcy court.61 If, on the other hand,
the preferred creditor wished to share in the distribution of the
assets of the estate, it was required to surrender its preference
as a condition.62 If the creditor did file a claim, it was required
to litigate any dispute about the preferential nature of the
transfer in the bankruptcy court, losing the right to a jury trial
that it otherwise might have had in a nonbankruptcy court pro-
ceeding.63 The purpose of the required election was not puni-
tive, but was solely to vindicate the fundamental bankruptcy
policy of equality of distribution.64 Although it was then
thought that important policies, including the right to jury trial,
supported the withholding of general avoidance jurisdiction
from the bankruptcy courts, these policies were subordinated
to basic bankruptcy policies in the context of an affirmative
claim against the assets of the estate, a claim necessarily in
competition with the claims of other creditors.65
58. 11 U.S.C. § 502(d) (Supp. IV 1980).
59. Id.
60. 11 U.S.C. §§ 96(b); 107(e) (1976) (repealed 1978). See 2 COLLIER (14th),
supra note 28, 1 23.15[7].
61. See, e.g., 3 COLLR (14th), supra note 28, 1 57.19; 2 COLLIER (14th),
supra note 28, 1 23.06 [9].
62. See 3 COLLIER (14th), supra note 28, T 57.19[1].
63. See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 338-40 (1966). See also 3 COLLIER
(14th), supra note 28, 57.19[5.1].
64. See 3 COLLER (14th), supra note 28, $ 57.19[2].
65. See In re Pollman, 156 F. 221, 222-23 (S.D.N.Y. 1907) (German creditor
recovered in part from its attachment of German realty); cf. In re Pacat Fl-
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Another example of this power is found in section 508 (a) of
the Code, which bars creditors who have received payment of
an allowed claim in a foreign proceeding from receiving any
payment from the bankrupt's U.S. assets until all other claim-
ants of equal priority have received payments of an equal
amount.66 This section helps protect U.S. claimants from the
effects of unequal treatment in a foreign proceeding even
though the U.S. bankruptcy court is powerless to control that
proceeding.
There is no conceptual reason why indirect protection of
fundamental bankruptcy policy should not obtain with respect
to postpetition arbitral awards through application of the nulli-
fication rule. Application of the rule would in effect put the
nonbankrupt party to an election similar to that faced by a
creditor receiving a voidable transfer. If a foreign arbitration
proceeding were pending when the U.S. party to the proceeding
filed a petition in bankruptcy, the foreign party could elect to
proceed with the arbitration, hoping to enforce any award
against the bankrupt's non-U.S. assets, or the foreign party
could elect to file a proof of claim in the bankruptcy court and
seek the court's permission to liquidate its claim in arbitration.
Under this approach, the U.S. courts would not appear to be
seeking any direct control over a foreign proceeding but would
be protecting the integrity of the bankrupt estate from false or
inflated claims for the benefit of the other creditors.
It might be objected that the approach suggested here
would require a foreign party to become entangled in the U.S.
courts contrary to its bargain. The response must be that pro-
ceedings in the U.S. courts are always required if one wishes to
enforce a foreign award against U.S. assets. Following the sug-
gested approach, the foreign party would be required to make
an application to the U.S. courts to obtain approval of proceed-
nance Corp., 295 F. 394, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 1923) (American creditor with French at-
tachment). See also Robinet, Brussels Trib. de Commerce, June 21, 1965,
Jurisprudence commerciale de Belgique 1-2 (1968) IV 161, discussed in
Nadelmann, Codification of Conflicts Rules for Bankruptcy (1974), reprinted in
Hearings on H.R. 31, 32 Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights
of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 27, pt. 3, at 1457, 1489-90
(1976) [hereinafter cited as Nadelmann, Codification] [the hearings hereinaf-
ter cited as Hearings]. Another example of this power under the old Act is
found in the power of the bankruptcy courts to enjoin lien enforcement, al-
though they lacked jurisdiction to determine the substantive rights of the se-
cured creditor. See Peitzman & Smith, The Secured Creditor's Complaint:
Relief From the Automatic Stays in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 65 CAL. L. REV.
1216, 1218, 1222 (1977).
66. 11 U.S.C. § 508(a) (Supp. V 1980).
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big with arbitration if, and only if, it wished to be able subse-
quently to assert any arbitral award as conclusive in
bankruptcy. Since a foreign party would have to retain U.S.
counsel and apply to the U.S. courts ultimately in any case, the
additional burden would be relatively minor.
2. Exceptions to Enforcement Under the U.N. Convention
Chapter 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act requires U.S.
courts to enforce the U.N. Convention in accordance with the
provisions of the Act.67 Section 207 of the Act provides that
U.S. courts shall confirm awards falling under the Convention
unless the court "finds one of the grounds for refusal or defer-
ral of recognition or enforcement of the award specified in the
said Convention."68 Article V of the Convention lists seven
grounds for refusing enforcement of an award, three of which
might plausibly apply where a party to an arbitration proceed-
ing has filed a petition in bankruptcy.
Article V(2) (b) is the broadest of the three grounds. It pro-
vides that enforcement may be refused if such enforcement
would violate the public policy of the enforcing state.69 The
U.S. courts have determined that this "public policy" limitation
is to be narrowly construed, so that its scope has been nar-
rowed to include only those policies that embody "the forum
state's most basic notions of morality and justice."7 0 It is not
likely that the bankruptcy policy underlying the nullification
rule rises to the level of that standard.
A second possible basis for nonenforcement is the excep-
tion provided in article V(2) (a), which permits nonenforcement
where "[t] he subject matter of the difference is not capable of
settlement by arbitration under the law of that country."71 En-
forcement could therefore be refused whenever the claim un-
derlying the foreign arbitral award could not have been settled
67. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1976).
68. Id. § 207.
69. U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. V, para. 2(b).
70. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe General De L'Industrie
du Papier, 508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974). See Island Territory of Curacao v.
Solitron Devices, Inc., 482 F.2d 1313, 1320 (2d Cir. 1973); Fertilizer Corp. v. IDI
Management, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 948, 955 (S.D. Ohio 1981); Laminoirs-Trefileries-
Cabeleries de Leas, S.A. v. Southwire Co., 484 F. Supp. 1063, 1068 (N.D. Ga.
1980); Antco Shipping Co. v. Sidermar, S.-A., 417 F. Supp. 207, 216 (S.D.N.Y.
1976); Biotronik Messand Therepiegerate v. Medford Medical Instruments Co.,
415 F. Supp. 133, 139 (D.N.J. 1976). See also Comment, supra note 38, at 732
n.33.
71. U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. V, para. 2(a).
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by arbitration under the domestic law of the enforcing state.
One could argue that, because claims against bankrupts are not
arbitrable in the United States without permission of the bank-
ruptcy court, the Convention does not require foreign awards
based on such claims to receive more favorable treatment. The
defect in this argument, however, lies in the language of the ex-
ception itself. By its terms, it applies only where the nature of
the dispute is not arbitrable generally, and not to the situation
in which the dispute is not arbitrable because of the status of
one of the parties.
There is one exception under the Convention which does
turn on the status of the parties. Article V(l) (a) authorizes
nonenforcement if "[t]he parties to the agreement ... were,
under the law applicable to them, under some incapacity
....72 Although this exception, on its face, seems to refer to
the parties' capacity at the time the arbitration agreement was
made, rather than to their capacity at the time of the arbitra-
tion proceedings, the background of the provision suggests that
the drafters were concerned with ensuring that both parties be
properly represented during the arbitration proceeding; there-
fore, the provision refers to the parties' capacity at the time of
arbitration. 3 Moreover, the incapacity determination is to be
72. U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. V, para. l(a). See also U.N. Doc.
E/CONF.26/SR.17, 24, International Commercial Arbitration-New York Con-
vention pt. II, at C (G. Gaja ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as ICA-Convention]; B.
Harrell, supra note 38, at 14-15. A provision regarding incapacity of a party as a
defense had been part of the earlier Geneva Convention on the Execution of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, 92 L.N.T.S. 301 (Sept. 26, 1927). This provision was
carried forward in the preliminary drafts submitted to the Conference by the
International Chamber of Commerce and by the 1955 Ad Hoc Committee. U.N.
Doc. E/2704 and Con. 1 (1958), ICA-Convention, supra, at A.1.4, Annex A.1.7. It
was omitted, however, from the working draft submitted to the Conference.
U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 26/L.43 (1958), ICA-Convention, supra, at B.5.1. Its omis-
sion may have arisen from a belief that an incapacity defense would rarely
arise, especially in a commercial context. See U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 26/SR.17
(1958), ICA-Convention, supra, at C.143. After several discussions of the issue,
the final language concerning incapacity was inserted at the last meeting of the
Conference. U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/5a24 (1958), ICA-Convention, supra, at
C.220, 221, 223. See also B. Harrell, supra note 38, at 14-15.
73. See Contini, International Commerical Arbitratio; 8 AM. J. COMP. L.
283, 300-01 (1959). The context in which the incapacity defense is found admit-
tedly suggests that it may refer to the parties' capacity when the arbitration
agreement arose, since article V(1) (a) deals with the validity of the agreement
underlying the award and the incapacity clause refers back to article II which
applies to recognition of the agreement prior to an award. The earlier drafts
containing the incapacity defense had not set it forth in the same provision
containing the agreement invalidity defense, but instead had expressly linked
incapacity to lack of proper representation. U.N. Doc. E/2704 and Con. 1 (1955),
ICA-Convention, supra note 72, at A.1.1, Annex .7 (1955 Ad Hoc Committee
draft); U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 26/L.17 (1958), ICA-Convention, supra note 72, at
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made "under the law applicable to [the parties]." This provi-
sion requires the application of the law of the party's home ju-
risdiction, as opposed to the law of the state in which the award
was made or the law of the underlying contract.74 In the case
of a U.S. party, U.S. law would apply.
The bankruptcy of one of the parties to an arbitration
agreement prior to an award falls squarely under this third ex-
ception. Under U.S. law, the bankrupt cannot bind the bank-
rupt estate by participating in a postpetition proceeding.7 5 If an
award against the bankrupt party would be ineffective against
the assets of the bankrupt under the law governing its capacity,
the party is under a legal incapacity with respect to those as-
sets. Since the Convention makes U.S. law applicable with re-
B.1.12 (Netherlands Amendments May 26, 1958). Of course, the change in the
location of the provision could be argued to demonstrate that the conference
intended to make it refer to capacity at the time the agreement arose. How-
ever, the Netherlands delegate who offered the incapacity language which was
adopted specifically referred to incapacity in relation to the award, not to the
agreement, suggesting that the focus remained upon incapacity during arbitra-
tion. U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 26/SR.24 (1958), ICA-Convention, supra note 72, at
C.220.
An earlier change offered by the Norwegian delegate had inserted the word
"proper" before the word "notice" in the provision which became article
V(1) (b). U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 26/SR17 (1958), ICA-Convention, supra note 72,
at C.148. The reason for this change was to provide "implicitly" for the incapac-
ity defense. Id. at C.143; P. SANDERS, 2 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCLAL ARBITRA-
TION 315 (1960); B. Harrell, supra note 38, at 14. Again this amendment strongly
suggests that the Conference was concerned with incapacity at the time of the
arbitration, since "proper" modified "notice... of the arbitration proceedings
... " Even if one accepted the argument that the Dutch amendment's new lo-
cation meant it referred to incapacity when the agreement arose, the adoption
of the Norwegian amendment on the basis stated certainly supports a defense
of incapacity at the time of the arbitration. It would seem better, however, to
base the defense on article V(1) (a), especially since a separate choice of law
provision is applied. The conflicts provision is generally consistent with U.S.
and international practice. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 31, § 17(b); Hon-
sberger, Conflict of Laws and the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 30 CASE W.L.
REV. 631, 636 (1980) (the decision whether to give effect to foreign judgments in
American courts is based in terms of international fair play and justice); cf.
Nadelmann, Rehabilitating International Bankruptcy Law: Lessons Taught by
Herstatt and Co., 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 32 (1977) (principle that extra-territorial
effect of bankruptcy judgment may only be sought for adjudications made at
debtor's commercial domicile). Cf. Draft of a Convention on Bankruptcy,
Winding-Up, Arrangements, Compositions and Similar Proceedings, reprinted
in 2 COMM. MEr. REP. (CCH) 1 6111, 6115 (1981) (exclusive jurisdiction in
bankruptcy in courts of state where debtor has center of administration).
74. U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 26/SR.24, ICA-Convention, supra note 72, at C.220.
See also P. SANDERS, supra note 73, at 315. The Netherland delegate who of-
fered the language which was adopted stated that the parties' capacity would
be tested only according to the law governing their personal status, and that
the change was not intended to have any other substantive effect. Id.
75. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
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spect to the capacity of U.S. parties, it follows that a bankrupt
U.S. party is "under some incapacity" for purposes of determin-
ing the enforceability of a postpetition arbitral award, and thus
such awards should not be enforceable under the Convention
as to bankruptcy estate assets. This result serves the underly-
ing purpose of both article V(1) (a) and the nullification rule,
both of which seek to ensure that the parties were adequately
represented in the arbitration proceeding.7 6
3. The Federal Policy Favoring International Arbitration
The U.S. courts long ago abandoned their hostility to reso-
lution of disputes by arbitration. One of the few limitations
that have survived, however, is the doctrine of Wilko v. Swan.77
In that case the Supreme Court declared that the plaintiff could
not be forced to arbitrate a federal Securities Act claim. Bal-
ancing arbitration policy against securities policy, the Court ex-
pressed particular concern that arbitration of securities claims
would deprive the courts of the opportunity to ensure that the
rights created by the Securities Act were effectively enforced.7 8
Two decades later a majority of the Supreme Court reacted
very differently when presented with a securities claim arising
from a transnational, rather than a domestic, transaction. In
Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.,7 9 the Securities Act claim arose
out of an international corporate acquisition structured as a
76. The United States is also a party to a number of bilateral arbitration
agreements. See Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70
YA. L.J. 1049, 1051-54 (1961). Accession to the U.N. Convention does not abro-
gate these treaties. U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. VII, para. 1. While these
treaties will not be analyzed in detail, it is believed that they would permit the
results which this Article suggests are permitted under the provisions of the
U.N. Convention, since they are generally less strict in requiring enforcement
than the U.N. Convention. Quigley, supra, at 1051-54.
The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration,
OAS Ser. A 20 (SEPF), reprinted in 14 IL.M. 336 (1975), has been sent to the
Senate for ratification. TREATY Doc. 97-12, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (June 15, 1981).
If it is approved, the analysis concerning enforcement of arbitration agree-
ments and awards in the bankruptcy context should be similar to that under
the U.N. Convention, since the drafters modeled the Inter-American Conven-
tion after the U.N. Convention. See Norberg, General Introduction to Inter-
American Commercial Arbitration, 1978 Y.B. COM. ARB. 1, 12. Compare U.N.
Convention, supra note 5, art. V, para. 1(a) (refusing enforcement of an award
where the parties were under some incapacity or where the agreement is not
valid under the law of the country where the award was made) with Inter-
American Convention, supra, art. V, para. 1(a) (similar).
77. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
78. Id. at 438.
79. 417 U.S. 506, reh'g denied, 417 U.S. 885 (1974).
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stock purchase. The acquisition agreement provided for Inter-
national Chamber of Commerce arbitration in Paris. The Court
held the arbitration clause fully enforceable despite the securi-
ties claim, rejecting the defendant's contention that Wilko was
dispositive of the arbitrability issue. The Court reasoned that
the protective policies of the securities laws were outweighed
in this case by the overriding importance of enforcing arbitra-
tion clauses in international contracts.8 0
In explaining its holding, the Court stressed the danger
that a dispute might be submitted to a forum hostile to one of
the parties in the absence of an agreement between the parties
specifying in advance the forum to which disputes shall be sub-
mitted.81 The neutrality of the arbitral forum is the most im-
portant factor in its widespread use internationally, despite
serious disadvantages of expense and delay.82 Because of the
need for neutrality and certainty in settling international dis-
putes, the Court in Scherk found the Wilko exception inappo-
site in the context of international arbitration agreements. 83
The Supreme Court's Scherk decision creates a substantial
potential conflict between U.S. bankruptcy policies and the pol-
icies announced in Scherk with regard to international arbitral
awards. The conflict should be resolved by seeking a solution
that accommodates the conflicting policies as much as possible.
In this instance, it seems that such an accommodation would
be best achieved by a rule requiring the prior approval of the
bankruptcy court for the commencement or continuance of an
international arbitration proceeding as a condition to enforcing
any award resulting from that arbitration in bankruptcy. Such
an approach would ensure the bankruptcy court's centralized
control of the liquidation of claims against the assets within its
control, while not affecting the validity of an unapproved award
against the foreign assets of the bankrupt. Furthermore, re-
quiring bankruptcy court approval would not prevent vindica-
tion of U.S. international trade policies, since the bankruptcy
courts could be required to respect international arbitration
agreements in most cases. The principal purpose of granting
the bankruptcy courts approval power would be to enable them
80. Id. at 516-17.
81. Id. at 516.
82. See, e.g., Goekjian, ICC Arbitration From A Practitioner's Perspective,
14 J. INT'L L. & ECON. 407, 430-31, 433-34 (1980); Geokian, supra note 1, at 410-11;
Paulsson, supra note 31, at 212; Stevenson, An Introduction to ICC Arbitration,
14 J. INT'L L. & EcoN. 381, 382-84 (1980).
83. 417 U.S. at 517.
1983]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
to control the timing of the arbitration in order to prevent de-
faults. On the other hand, the contrary rule adopted in
Fotochrome takes the process of liquidating claims against the
bankrupt estate completely out of the bankruptcy court's
hands, thereby risking the diminution of the bankrupt estate by
claims obtained by default or quasi-default.84 There is nothing
in bankruptcy court control in itself that materially reduces the
foreign party's rights, other than its "right" to take advantage of
a financially distressed debtor distracted by the rush into
bankruptcy.S5
H. THE BANKRUPTCY COURT'S POWER TO REFUSE
ARBITRATION
If a nonbankrupt party seeks bankruptcy court approval to
liquidate its claim in arbitration pursuant to an arbitration
agreement with the bankrupt, but the trustee objects, the court
must determine the extent of its power to refuse to enforce the
arbitration agreement against the trustee. This part of the dis-
cussion seeks to identify the circumstances under which it
would be appropriate for the bankruptcy court to refuse ap-
proval of the nonbankrupt party's request to arbitrate its claim
against the bankrupt.
A. THE TRUSTEE'S POWER TO REJECT ARBITRATION
AGREEMENTS
In bankruptcy the efficacy of an arbitration agreement lies
in the power of a contract between a creditor and the debtor to
bind the trustee.86 Although the trustee in bankruptcy suc-
84. The better rule can be followed even in the Second Circuit without do-
ing violence to stare decisis, because of the policy developments represented
by the pervasive stay adopted in the Bankruptcy Rules and in the new Bank-
ruptcy Code, neither of which applied to the dispute in Fotochrome. Such a
rule will ensure the avoidance of defaults. Whether the courts should go fur-
ther and claim discretion in some instances to refuse to enforce international
arbitration agreements in bankruptcy is the subject of Part Il of this Article.
85. While this Article does not discuss the effect to be given foreign court
judgments rendered against the debtor after bankruptcy, presumptively they
should be treated no better than arbitration awards. To apply the nullification
rule to them is to treat them no differently than U.S. postpetition judgments.
See supra text accompanying note 43. Moreover, foreign judgments do not in-
voke the special consideration given to foreign arbitral awards. The United
States is not party to a convention for the enforcement of judgments and there
is no policy equivalent to that of Scherk applicable to foreign judgments.
86. See, e.g., Caribbean S.S. Co. v. Sonmea Denizcilik VE Ticaret A.S., 598
F.2d 1264, 1266 (2d Cir. 1979); Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 35
A.D.2d 469, 471, 318 N.Y.S.2d 764, 766 (N.Y. App. Div.), aff'd, 29 N.Y.2d 690, 325
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ceeds to the debtor's assets with all the burdens of the debtor's
preexisting contractual obligations, 87 the Bankruptcy Code
grants the trustee the power to assume or reject any executory
contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.88 According to the
best-known test, a contract is considered executory if "the obli-
gation of both the bankrupt and the other party to the contract
are [sic] so far unperformed that the failure of either to com-
plete performance would constitute a material breach excusing
the performance of the other."8 9
If the trustee assumes, the trustee must assume the bur-
dens as well as the benefits of the contract-the trustee must
accept the contract as a whole.90 Upon assumption, the trustee
is obligated to perform the contract in full as is the nonbank-
rupt party.9 1 Therefore, the costs of the trustee's performance
of, or failure to perform, an assumed contract are administra-
tive expenses payable in administration dollars.92
If, on the other hand, the trustee rejects an executory con-
tract, the rejection constitutes a breach of the contract and sub-
jects the estate to a claim for money damages on behalf of the
injured party.93 Significantly, however, the injured party can-
not insist on specific performance by the trustee.94 Instead, the
N.Y.S.2d 419 (1971); M. DOMKE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF COMMERCIAL ARBI-
TRATION § 10.06, at 86-87 (1968).
87. See, e.g., Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 35 A.D.2d at
471, 318 N.Y.S.2d at 766.
88. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (Supp. IV 1980). See generally 2 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY $ 365.01 (15th ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER (15th)]. The statu-
tory language is "assume" or "reject." Assumption is sometimes called
"acceptance," "adoption," or "affirmance," while rejection is sometimes termed
"disaffirmance."
89. Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 439, 460 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Countryman, Part I]. For cases apply-
ing Professor Countryman's formulation, see, e.g., In re Select-A-Seat Corp., 625
F.2d 290, 292 (9th Cir. 1980); In re Chicago, Rock L & Pac. Ry. Co., 604 F.2d 1002,
1004 (7th Cir. 1979); Jenson v. Continental Fin. Corp., 591 F.2d 477, 481 (8th Cir.
1979); In re Knutson, 563 F.2d 916, 917 (8th Cir. 1977); In re Tilev, 558 F.2d 1369,
1372 (10th Cir. 1977); In re Unishops, Inc., 553 F.2d 305, 308 (2d Cir. 1977). The
Sixth Circuit has offered another approach to the executory contract problem.
Chattanooga Memorial Park v. Still (In re Jolly), 574 F.2d 349, 350-52 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 929 (1978) (contract not executory if the purposes of rejec-
tion have already been achieved or cannot be achieved through rejection).
90. 2 COLLIER (15th), supra note 88, 365.01, at 365-67.
91. Id.
92. Id. See also Fogel, Executory Contracts and Unexpired Leases in the
Bankruptcy Code, 64 MImN. L. REV. 341, 379 (1980).
93. 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (Supp. IV 1980).
94. See In re Philadelphia Penn Worsted Co., 278 F.2d 661, 664 (3d Cir.
1960); National Bank v. Louisville Trust Co., 67 F.2d 97, 101 (6th Cir. 1933), cert.
denied, 291 U.S. 665 (1934); In re New York Investors Mut. Groups, Inc., 143 F.
Supp. 51, 54 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); In re Middleton, 3 Bankr. 610, 613 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
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injured party is treated as having a prepetition claim for dam-
ages arising as if the breach occurred immediately before the
filing of the bankruptcy petition.9 5 A rejection claim, in con-
trast to an assumption claim, is therefore payable in less valua-
ble bankruptcy dollars.
If the trustee rejects a contract containing an arbitration
clause, the trustee creates a prepetition claim for breach in
favor of the other party to the contract. The latter may also
have other prepetition claims against the debtor under the
other provisions of the contract. The issue is whether these
prepetition claims, including the claim arising from rejection,
must be liquidated pursuant to the arbitration clause. The few
cases addressing the issue have pointed in both directions.96
Tobin v. Plein97 is the only case holding an arbitration
agreement enforceable without qualification. There a corpora-
tion went into bankruptcy and its trustee sought arbitration, al-
leging breach of contract by one of the shareholders. The
district court ruled that the contract must be deemed rejected
because the trustee had not assumed it within the prescribed
period.98 It further held that the claims arising out of the re-
jected contract were not subject to the arbitration clause in the
contract.99 The court of appeals, without analysis or argument,
reversed, holding that rejection of the contract did not affect
the arbitrability of the prepetition claims.100
1980); see also Countryman, Part I, supra note 89, at 440 n.11; cf. Express Co. v.
Railroad Co., 99 U.S. 191, 200-01 (1878) (injured party cannot insist on specific
performance by receiver appointed in foreclosure proceedings). But see Julis,
Classifying Rights and Interests Under the Bankruptcy Code, 55 AM. BANKM.
LJ. 223, 232-42 (1981).
95. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(g) (1); 502(g) (Supp. IV 1980).
96. M. DomKE, supra note 86, at § 10.06.
97. 301 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1962).
98. Id. at 379.
99. Id. at 381.
100. Id. In Tobin, the trustee wanted arbitration, while the other party
claimed the contract was "deemed" rejected by the passage of time. Id. at 380.
In liquidation cases, an executory contract is deemed rejected if not assumed
by the trustee'within sixty days after bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d) (1) (Supp.
IV 1980). The nonbankrupt party is often the one urging that a contract must
be deemed rejected, on the other hand, the trustee may have inadvertently
failed to assume an otherwise favorable contract. In these circumstances, the
court finds itself being urged to use the trustee's avoidance powers against the
trustee. Skewed results may follow from this anomaly. Tobin may be a case
where the "deemed rejected" rule made the result different from that which
would have obtained had the trustee sought to reject the arbitration agreement.
A recent case squarely presented the issue discussed in the text, but the
court declined to decide it. Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 435 n.7 (2d Cir.),
cert denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977). This case may be read as casting some doubt
on the authority of Tobin.
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In Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807 v. Bohack Corp., 1o a
Chapter XI case, the debtor rejected its collective bargaining
agreement with its employees, and the employee's union filed a
grievance under the contract's arbitration provision. Ulti-
mately, the issue in the case became the arbitrability of the
union's claims for damages on account of the debtor's rejection
of the contract. The Second Circuit held that the arbitration
agreement survived bankruptcy, 0 2 although it apparently rec-
ognized that the bankruptcy court retained discretion to refuse
arbitration. 0 3
L.O. Koven & Brother, Inc. v. Local Union No. 5767 United
Steel Workers of America, AFL-CIO, 1o4 relied on by the Bohack
court 0 5 and also involving a union grievance, arose after the
confirmation of a reorganization plan and after the discharge of
the bankrupt company from a Chapter XI proceeding. Koven
held that the union's nonbankruptcy claims were subject to the
101. 541 F.2d 312 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978).
102. Id. at 319-21.
103. Id. at 320-21, 320 n.13. The district court, on remand, apparently inter-
preted the Second Circuit opinion as requiring arbitration of the union's rejec-
tion claims. Bohack Corp. v. Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807, 431 F. Supp.
646, 655 (E.D.N.Y.), affd, 567 F.2d 237 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825
(1978).
104. 381 F.2d 196 (3d Cir. 1967).
105. The court of appeals opinion in Bohack also relied upon Schilling v.
Canadian Foreign S.S. Co., 190 F. Supp. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). Schilling in fact in-
dicated that arbitration agreements could not be enforced with respect to
claims against the debtor, the situation presented in Bohack. Id. at 463. This
comment in Schilling must be treated as dictum, however, since that case dealt
with claims by the debtor and the court distinguished such claims from claims
against the debtor. Id. It held that the debtor was required to assert its claims
against the other party in arbitration pursuant to their contractual arbitration
clause, even though the debtor would not be bound to arbitrate a claim by the
other party against the debtor. Id.
The "defensive-offensive" distinction suggested in Schilling has some su-
perficial appeal but may be unworkable in practice. Commercial litigation
often involves both a claim and a counterclaim. Bifurcated litigation is obvi-
ously undesirable. It is true that frequently one party would be much happier
with a "wash" (no recovery on either side) than the other-i.e., is conscious of
less merit in its position-but identification of the "real" claimant at a prelimi-
nary stage is often difficult. Of course, the trustee may be forced to arbitrate if
the trustee cannot obtain personal jurisdiction over a foreign party in bank-
ruptcy court and if the other party chooses not to assert a claim against the
bankrupt. In that case, the trustee could be required to remain in the arbitral
forum for all purposes. See Harmon v. Komisar, 15 Tenn. App. 405, 409 (1932).
The argument would be that the trustee assumed the contract by his conduct.
But see 2 COLLIR (15th), supra note 88, $ 365.03, at 365-21-23; 4A COLLIER
(14th), supra note 28, T 70.43, at 531. Under any other circumstances, it is sug-
gested that the enforcement of the arbitration agreement should turn on the




arbitration agreement.106 The court's holding was based ex-
pressly on the fact that the claims were against the surviving
company, not against the bankrupt estate, and therefore no
rights of bankruptcy creditors were in any way implicated.107
The case thus offers no support for the proposition that a
trustee is bound by an arbitration clause in the litigation of
claims against the estate. If anything can be drawn from Ko-
yen, it is the negative of that proposition, based on the Koven
court's strenuous effort to distinguish claims against an estate
from the nonbankruptcy claims before the court.108
The leading case refusing enforcement of an arbitration
agreement against a trustee is Johnson v. England.10 9 The dis-
pute in Johnson involved the prebankruptcy failure of the
debtor to make a required payment to its employees' pension
fund pursuant to the collective bargaining contract. The court
held that the arbitration agreement in the collective bargaining
contract was not binding, because arbitration would affect the
interests of the trustee and the bankrupt's general creditors,
parties who had never consented to arbitration.11 0 As in
Bohack, however, the court focused primarily on the nature of
the issues to be resolved as being more or less suitable for arbi-
tration, without mentioning the rejection doctrine. The court
nevertheless made it clear that it would approve arbitration of
certain aspects of the dispute in the exercise of the lower
court's discretion."'
106. The claims were for prebankruptcy and postbankruptcy breaches of
the collective bargaining agreement. 381 F.2d at 198-200.
107. Id. at 203-04.
108. There are several other cases in which arbitration agreements were en-
forced in bankruptcy, but in situations like Koven where creditors were not
threatened. See, e.g., Fillick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899, 905 (2d Cir. 1966) (criticized
in Comment, Bankruptcy---Ancillary Jurisdiction-Arbitration of Pre-Bank-
ruptcy Claim Held Not to Present Unusual Circumstance Justifying Exercise of
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 743 (1967)) (non-dischargeable claim
versus debtor); Transmarittina Sarda Italnavi Flotte Ruiniti, S.P-A. v. Foremost
Ins. Co., 482 F. Supp. 110, 113-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (claim against insurer); Ameri-
can Ship Building Co. v. Willy H. Schlieker, K.G., 219 F. Supp. 905, 908 (S.D.N.Y.
1963) (letter of credit payable against award); In re Grain Products Corp., 20 F.
Supp. 134, 134 (S.D.N.Y. 1937) (bank deposit); Plein v. Charchat, 17 A.D.2d 25,
28, 230 N.Y.S.2d 633, 636 (N.Y. App. Div. 1962) (claim of corporation's trustee in
bankruptcy against 50% shareholder for diverting funds); see generally Auto-
matic Stay Part I, supra note 29, at 212.
109. 356 F.2d 44 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 961 (1966).
110. Id. at 51. Accord Cuvrell v. Mazur (In re F & T Contractors, Inc.), 649
F.2d 1229, 1232 (6th Cir. 1981).
111. 356 F.2d at 51-52. Accord, e.g., Cuvrell v. Mazur, 649 F.2d at 1232; In re
Muskegon Motor Specialties Co., 313 F.2d 841, 843 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub
nom. International Union, UAW v. Davis, 375 U.S. 832 (1963).
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Surprisingly, none of these courts analyzed these cases as
a traditional executory contract problem. It is now firmly es-
tablished in the United States, as well as in many other coun-
tries, that an arbitration clause is considered a separable
contract between the parties which survives as an obligation of
the promisor even if the underlying contract is voidable.112
Viewed as an independent contractual obligation of the parties,
an arbitration agreement is a classic executory contract, since
neither side has substantially performed the arbitration agree-
ment at the time enforcement is sought.113 Although "arbitra-
tion survives the contract" as a matter of contract law,
executory obligations may be avoided by the trustee as a mat-
ter of bankruptcy law through the exercise of the trustee's
power to reject executory contracts.114 What makes an arbitra-
tion clause "survive" the contract'' 5 is that courts are willing to
enforce specifically such agreements by issuing an order stay-
ing any judicial proceeding and compelling arbitration.116 To
112. See, e.g., Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395,
402-04 (1967); M. DoimKE, supra note 86, at Ch. 8; Comment, Federal Arbitration
Act and Application of the "Separability Doctrine" in Federal Courts, 1968
DuKE L.J. 588, 588-89. The defendant in Prima Paint was in bankruptcy-in-
deed its filing of a petition one week after the signing of the contract between
the parties was the source of the plaintiff's annoyance. 388 U.S. at 398. There
the bankrupt sought arbitration, so that the main questions here considered
were not presented. For a similar severability rule in a number of other coun-
tries, see 1981 Y.B. COM. ARB. 7 (France), 34 (Italy), 65 (Netherlands); 1980 Y.B.
CoM. Arn. 6 (Belgium), 63 (Greece), 87 (Indonesia), 100 (Norway); 1979 Y.B.
COM. ARn. 8 (Algeria), 27 (Austria), 65-66 (West Germany), 122 (Japan); 1978
Y.B. COM. ARB. 20 (Argentina), 97-98 (Mexico), 165 (Sweden), 187 (Switzer-
land); 1977 Y.B. COM. Aim. 6 (Australia); 1976 Y.B. COM. Arm. 20 (Bulgaria), 55
(Hungary), 67 (Poland), 80 (Rumania). But see 1979 Y.B. COM. AnB. 47 (Egypt),
141 (Kuwait); 1978 Y.B. COM. ARB. 108 (Panama); 1977 Y.B. COM. ARB. 34-35 (In-
dia), 51 (Israel), 67-68 (Nigeria), 78-79 (South Africa), 96 (United Kingdom);
1976 Y.B. COM. ARB. 43 (East Germany) (enumerating conditions in which an
arbitral clause perishes along with the contract).
113. See 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1976). Failure to perform the arbitration agreement by
either party would excuse the other from performance. Mogge v. District No. 8,
IAM, 387 F.2d 880, 883 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 936 (1968) (dictum); Lane,
Ltd. v. Larus & Brother Co., 243 F.2d 364, 367 (2d Cir. 1957). On that basis, the
Countryman test for an executory contract is satisfied. See supra text accom-
panying note 89.
114. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (Supp. IV 1980). 'The very purpose of bank-
ruptcy proceedings is to diminish the rights of the creditors." Schilling v. Cana-
dian Foreign S.S. Co., 190 F. Supp. 462, 463 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
115. See, e.g., Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807 v. Bohack Corp., 541 F.2d
312, 321 n.15 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978); In re Pahlberg Peti-
tion, 131 F.2d 968, 970 (2d Cir. 1942).
116. The statutes requiring enforcement of arbitration agreements simply
grant the remedy of specific performance denied by the common law on policy
grounds. Trafalgar Shipping Co. v. International Milling Co., 401 F.2d 568, 573
n.5 (2d Cir. 1968); Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d
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compel a trustee to arbitrate, however, would be to require spe-
cific performance by the trustee of an obligation of the debtor, a
remedy the law will not grant against a trustee in bank-
ruptcy.117 If specific performance is not available against a
trustee, it follows that an arbitration agreement is like any
other executory contract which the trustee may reject.
The reason for the availability of specific performance to
enforce arbitration agreements outside bankruptcy is that the
harm arising from a breach of an arbitration agreement is often
difficult or impossible to measure in damages."i8 For the same
reason, a claim for damages against a trustee in bankruptcy
based on a rejected arbitration clause is also unlikely to ade-
quately compensate the injured party. The same is true, in
bankruptcy, of other specifically enforceable contractual obliga-
tions, notably contracts for the sale of land.119 The justification
for the rule is that permitting specific performance would pre-
fer those creditors to which it was granted over others with
equally meritorious claims,12 0 since specific performance of a
contract results in full satisfaction while payment in money
978, 981-85 (2d Cir. 1942) (Frank, J.). See Guinness-Harp Corp. v. Joseph Schlitz
Brewing Co., 613 F.2d 468, 472 (2d Cir. 1980); Joseph Muller Corp. Zurich v.
Commonwealth Petrochemicals, Inc., 334 F. Supp. 1013, 1018 (S.D.N.Y. 1971)
(dictum); In re Utility ORl Corp., 10 F. Supp. 678, 680 (S.D.N.Y. 1934) (dictum).
See also 5A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1173 at 272 (1962). In the
F.A.A., Congress merely intended to put arbitration agreements on the same
footing as other contracts in this regard, and thus the usual equitable defenses
to specific performance are available to resist enforcement of such an agree-
ment. Kulukundis Shipping Corp. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d at 987 &
n.30. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. at 404 n.12.
But cf. Halcon Int'l, Inc. v. Monsanto Australia Ltd., 446 F.2d 156, 163 (7th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 949, reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 1029 (1972) (issue of
laches is for administrator, not court); Trafalgar Shipping Co. v. International
Milling Co., 401 F.2d at 572-73 (on motion to compel arbitration, district court
may consider any claims of laches which relate to issues the court must de-
cide-arbitrator must resolve such claims which relate to issues that parties
have agreed to submit to arbitration).
117. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
118. Ordinarily only nominal damages can be recovered. 6A A. CORBIN,
supra note 116, § 1440 at 419; 16 S. WILLISToN, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRAcTS § 1918A n.9, § 1923 nn.11-14 (1976). See Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Am-
torg Trading Corp., 126 F.2d at 987 n.30 (dictum).
119. See Countryman, Part I, supra note 89, at 463-73. The new Code
changes this result as to those purchasers in possession under a land sale con-
tract. 11 U.S.C. 365(i) (Supp. IV 1980). See Countryman, Executory Contracts
in Bankruptcy, Part II, 58 MINN. L. REV. 479, 565-66 (1974) [hereinafter cited as
Countryman, Part 11].
120. National Bank v. Louisville Trust Co., 67 F.2d 97, 100 (6th Cir. 1933),
cert. denied, 291 U.S. 665 (1934). See In re New York Investors Mut. Group, Inc.,




damages in bankruptcy dollars results in only partial satisfac-
tion. Whatever maxims of equity might be raised here, the rule
is based on the policy judgment that it is better that the credi-
tors ordinarily entitled to specific performance should suffer for
the good of all the creditors of the estate.' 21
There is, moreover, nothing in the Convention which re-
quires that international arbitration agreements be treated any
differently from domestic agreements when one of the parties
has filed for relief in bankruptcy. Since arbitration agreements
need not be enforced against a bankrupt party under the Con-
vention,12 2 international arbitration agreements may be re-
jected in bankruptcy consistently with U.S. obligations under
the Convention. 2 3
The Bankruptcy Code, however, conditions the trustee's
121. Holding that specific performance is not automatically available against
a trustee with respect to international arbitration agreements of the debtor is
not inconsistent with the results, if not the language, in most of the reported
cases. These cases have emphasized discretionary factors in allocating dis-
putes between arbitration and bankruptcy. Permitting the trustee to reject
such agreements in certain egregious cases is consistent with the discretion
granted the bankruptcy courts in previous decisions.
122. See supra text accompanying notes 72-76.
123. A rule which forbade rejection of international arbitration contracts
would vindicate the Scherk policies at the expense of the important bankruptcy
policies underlying the rejection power. The effect, at least in some cases,
might be to deplete the estate unreasonably to the prejudice of other creditors.
On the other hand, permitting rejection in principle will serve the bankruptcy
policies without necessarily harming the trade policy, because rejection can be
limited to special circumstances.
A de minirnus argument might also be made: there will be little harm done
to international arbitration policies f the occasional bankrupt is able to escape
arbitration; the enforceability of international arbitration agreements will re-
main sufficiently predictable to ensure their continued use in international
trade. The additional risk of dealing with a U.S. party will be minimal, unless
the party appears at the outset to be financially weak.
This argument, standing alone, does not support a U.S. rule permitting the
trustee of a bankrupt to avoid an international arbitration agreement. It ig-
nores how "easy" U.S. bankruptcy may appear to our principal trading part-
ners, whose bankruptcy laws are stricter. The tremendous sophistication of the
reorganization mechanism in the United States, and the great concern our
bankruptcy judges have for successful rehabilitation, means that marginal U.S.
companies may seek bankruptcy help under circumstances far less dire than
those required to persuade a European company to do so. See, e.g. In re
Manville Corp. Nos. 82 Bankruptcy 11656-11676 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 1982). One
can imagine situations in which a single contract with an arbitration clause
might be so important to a U.S. company that it might consider bankruptcy just
to get the benefits of a U.S. forum. For a company like Fotochrome, for exam-
ple, the Copal dispute might be so large relative to its overall business that
bankruptcy to avoid the arbitration clause might make sense, especially if there
were some arguments for bankruptcy because of other company problems.
The principal justification for the rule urged in the text is the necessity of
bankruptcy court claims control to the purposes of U.S. bankruptcy laws.
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power of rejection on the approval of the bankruptcy court. 2 4
In exercising its discretion to withhold or grant approval, the
bankruptcy court is faced with the additional policy considera-
tions enunciated in Scherk when confronted with an interna-
tional, as opposed to a domestic, arbitration agreement. The
proper ambit of the court's discretion is the subject of the next
section.
B. THE LIMITS OF THE COURT'S DISCRETION TO PERMIT
REJECTION OF AN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION
AGREEMENT
1. In General
Traditionally, the trustee in bankruptcy enjoyed broad dis-
cretion in assuming or rejecting executory contracts. The stan-
dard, derived from the notion of abandonment of an
unprofitable asset of the debtor, has been a purely financial
one: the trustee should be permitted to reject if it would relieve
the estate from a burdensome obligation; on the other hand,
the trustee should be permitted to assume if assumption would
aid in the liquidation or rehabilitation of the estate. 2 5
In recent years the problem of rejecting collective bargain-
ing agreements has given rise to some restrictions on the
power of the trustee to reject contracts on a purely financial ba-
sis.126 In Shopmen's Local Union No. 455 v. Kevin Steel Prod-
uct, Inc., 127 the court found a conflict between the policies
124. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (Supp. IV 1980). One exception of substantial practi-
cal importance is that a contract is deemed rejected in chapter 7 liquidation af-
ter the passage of 60 days from entry of the order for relief. Id. § 365(d) (1).
Such a "deemed" rejection need not always be given effect. 2 CoLLIER (15th),
supra note 88, 365.03, at 365-69. Where important federal policies must be
given weight in considering approval of the rejection of a contract, as with col-
lective bargaining agreements, an automatic rejection rule should not apply.
See infra text accompanying notes 126-30. If federal policies regarding interna-
tional arbitration are given the same deference as labor policies, as urged be-
low, then the "deemed rejection" rule should not be applied to international
arbitration agreements either.
125. See Fogel, supra note 92, at 345.
126. See 2 COTS R (15th), supra note 88, 365.03; cf. Control Data Corp. v.
Zelman (In re Minges), 602 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1979) (power of trustee to reject
executory lease provisions requires a reasonable likelihood that general credi-
tors will derive substantial or significant benefit from proposed lease rejection).
127. 519 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1975). Earlier cases which had discussed the prob-
lem included Carpenters Local Union No. 2746 v. Turney Wood Prod., Inc., 289
F. Supp. 143, 149 (W.D. Ark. 1968); In re Overseas Nat'l Airways, Inc., 238 F.
Supp. 359, 360 (E.D.N.Y. 1965); In re Klaber Bros., Inc., 173 F. Supp. 83, 85
(S.D.N.Y. 1959); In re Public Ledger, Inc., 63 F. Supp. 1008, 1013 (E.D. Pa. 1945),
rev'd in part 161 F.2d 762 (3d Cir. 1947).
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underlying two federal statutes: the Bankruptcy Act and the
National Labor Relations Act.128 In seeking to accommodate
these policies, the court held that although collective bargain-
ing contracts are subject to rejection in bankruptcy, the bank-
ruptcy court, in approving or disapproving rejection, would be
required to consider not only the financial benefit or detriment
to the bankrupt estate, but also the weighty federal policies
favoring collective bargaining and the enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements. 29 Another decision, following on the
heels of Kevin Steel, tipped the balance decisively in favor of
the labor relations policies- of the N.L.R.A., holding that these
policies forbid rejection unless the failure to reject will lead to
collapse of the debtor's business and the loss of the employees'
jobs.130 These cases make it clear that countervailing federal
policies can be brought to bear on the decision to reject a con-
tract in bankruptcy, and that these policies can be given great
weight.
A bankruptcy court confronted with a trustee's request to
reject an international arbitration agreement faces a similar
conflict of federal policies. The strength of the public policy
favoring the enforcement of such agreements in international
trade is demonstrated by Scherk.13 1 Following the example of
the labor cases, it seems clear that the bankruptcy court should
be required to enforce an international arbitration agreement
unless there are very strong reasons for rejection in a particu-
lar case. Practical considerations following from the usual
course of arbitration and the common situations presented in
bankruptcy suggest three possible bases for rejection of an in-
ternational arbitration clause: 1) very burdensome relative
cost; 2) very burdensome relative delay; and 3) non-enforce-
ability of the arbitration agreement under nonbankruptcy law.
128. The court denied a conflict, but proceeded to analyze the case as if
there were one. 519 F.2d at 704-07. See Comment, Rejection of Collective Bar-
gaining Agreements by Trustees in Bankruptcy, 81 Dic. L. REV. 64, 75 (1976).
129. 519 F.2d at 707.
130. Brotherhood of Ry. Employees v. REA Express, Inc., 523 F.2d 164, 172
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1017 (1975). See Comment, supra note 128,
at 79-80. See also Truck Drivers Local Union No. 807 v. Bohack Corp., 541 F.2d
312, 320 (2d cir. 1976), cert.denied, 439 U.S. 825 (1978) (affirming support of Ke-
vin Steel and REA Express); In re Alan Wood Steel Co., 449 F. Supp. 165, 169
(E.D. Pa. 1978) (application to reject a collective bargaining agreement must be
carefully scrutinized). But see In re Bildisco, 682 F.2d 72, 79-81 (3d Cir. 1982)
(rejecting the more stringent test of REA Express and adopting the balancing
test of Kevin Steel).




As more bankruptcy cases are filed, there will no doubt be
instances in which arbitration will be quicker and less expen-
sive than proceeding in bankruptcy. Nonetheless, the greatest
contemporary criticism of international arbitration is its grow-
ing cost and increasing delay. 3 2 As a result, bankruptcy liqui-
dation of claims and counterclaims will often be cheaper and
faster. 33
Imagine a liquidation case in which Debtor Corporation is
a U.S. distributor of both U.S. and foreign products. After a pe-
riod of fast and profitable expansion domestically, the debtor
enters into a large contract with Asian Manufacturing Com-
pany to distribute Asian's products in the United States. The
contract provides for arbitration by the International Chamber
of Commerce in a neutral forum, Taiwan. Shortly thereafter,
the debtor's over-rapid expansion, together with an economic
downturn, causes the company's financial collapse, and the
corporation fies for relief in bankruptcy. The estate has assets,
after normal administration costs, of about $300,000, and domes-
tic claims of about $300,000. Asian asserts a breach-of-contract
claim for $500,000, including lost profits. The trustee, seeking to
reject the arbitration agreement, estimates that it will cost the
estate $25,000 to litigate the Asian claim in the bankruptcy
court and $75,000 to arbitrate in Taiwan. Asian estimates that it
will spend $50,000 to arbitrate in Taiwan, but $75,000 if it has to
litigate in the U.S. bankruptcy court. The $25,000 difference
would presumably be claimable by Asian as damages if the
trustee rejects the arbitration agreement.
Under these circumstances, both parties will find a victory
more favorable if Asian's claim is liquidated in bankruptcy. If
the trustee wins, the general creditors of the estate recover
eighty-four cents on the dollar in bankruptcy but only seventy-
five cents on the dollar by a victory in arbitration. 34 Asian also
fares better with a bankruptcy victory. It recovers thirty-three
132. See supra note 82.
133. See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipeline Co., 6 Bankr.
928, 930 (Bankr. Minn. 1980).
134. If the trustee wins in bankruptcy, assets remaining after expenses of
litigation are $275,000 and claims are $325,000 ($300,000 from domestic creditors
plus $25,000 representing Asian's rejection claim). The pro-rata recovery of the
creditors is thus 84% of their prebankruptcy claims. If the trustee wins in arbi-
tration, assets of the estate are reduced to $225,000 by the increased cost of liti-
gating in arbitration, and claims against assets are only $300,000 (Asian has no
rejection claim if the dispute is settled according to the arbitration agreement),
resulting in a pro-rata distribution to creditors equal to 75% of their claims.
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cents on the dollar in bankruptcy, while recovering only
twenty-eight cents on the dollar with a victory in arbitration.135
Asian might nonetheless have a legitimate desire to liquidate
its claim in a neutral arbitral forum rather than in a U.S. court,
a desire that could reasonably outweigh Asian's interest in a
slightly greater recovery if the claim were liquidated in a U.S.
bankruptcy court. The court, under these circumstances, could
reasonably find that cost does not compel bankruptcy liquida-
tion, and therefore grant the nonbankrupt party's request for
arbitration.136
On a rare set of facts cost could lead to a different result. If
one assumes the same set of facts as above, except that the es-
tate is worth only $75,000, liquidation of Asian's claim in arbi-
tration would extinguish the estate to the detriment of Asian
and the debtor's U.S. creditors, whereas liquidation in bank-
ruptcy preserves some positive value in the estate for distribu-
tion to the creditors. 3 7 These circumstances are analogous to
the labor cases in which the courts held that an arbitration
agreement may be rejected-that is, failure to reject will sink
the debtor to the injury of the nonbankrupt party as well as the
other creditors. Presumably, the same conclusion should ob-
tain as to an arbitration agreement in a situation in which the
available bankruptcy assets will simply not support the addi-
tional expense of arbitration.
The above examples have admittedly been oversimplified;
actual cases will rarely be so easy. For one thing, attorney's
fees are often awarded in arbitration' 38 so that in reality com-
putations will be more complicated. More important, the par-
ties' actual concern under facts like those hypothesized would
be with settlement; litigation would likely make little sense for
135. If Asian wins in bankruptcy, the assets of the estate would be $275,000,
and the claims against it would be $825,000 ($300,000 due to domestic creditors,
$500,000 due to Asian's contract claim, and $25,000 due to Asian's rejection
claim), resulting in a recovery of 33 %% of the creditor's claims. Thus, Asian
would recover $175,000 ($525,000 x 33 %%), for a net recovery of $100,000
($175,000 - $75,000) after taking into account its costs. If Asian wins in arbitra-
tion, the assets of the estate would be only $225,000, and the claims $800,000, giv-
ing creditors 28% of their prebankruptcy claims. Asian's net recovery in
arbitration is thus only $90,625 ($140,625 - $50,000) after expenses.
136. This highly over-simplified analysis ignores many important factors,
notably the likelihood that Asian will be unlikely to win the full amount of its
claims.
137. If Asian's claim is liquidated in arbitration, the estate is reduced to
zero by the costs of litigation, and nobody recovers anything no matter who
wins. On the other hand, if liquidation is in bankruptcy, there remain $50,000 of
assets in the estate for distribution to creditors, including Asian.
138. See, e.g., LC.C. Arb. I. ArL 20 (1975).
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either party. On the other hand, settlements are the products
of the parties' predictions of litigation costs and likely results-
the latter prediction being strongly influenced by the forum-so
that even an admittedly simplistic analysis to some extent re-
flects the background against which a settlement would be
struck. One can be sure that rejection or assumption of the ar-
bitration agreement would be a very important practical factor
in the shape of any settlement.
3. Relative Delay
Another factor which a trustee might urge in favor of rejec-
tion of arbitration is relative delay. Imagine, for example, a
chapter 11 proceeding in which Asian has a very large claim
arising from the discontinued part of Debtor Corporation's
business. The debtor's plan of reorganization assumes going
forward with a much smaller company with much smaller reve-
nues than before. The projected profits are enough to fund a
plan acceptable to domestic creditors if the Asian claim is
either defeated or substantially reduced, but the plan would be-
come less attractive than liquidation to the creditors if Asian's
entire claim is accepted. If the trustee could show that arbitra-
tion would take at least two years, while bankruptcy litigation
could be concluded within a year, and if the creditors' commit-
tee13 9 advised the court that a majority of the creditors would
vote for liquidation rather than accept a two year delay in con-
firming a plan,140 the court could reasonably find that the case
presented a compelling reason to deny arbitration. In this in-
stance, it could be said that the temporal assets of the estate
are unable to support arbitration, just as the financial assets
could not do so in the previous example.141 Since all creditors
would suffer from assumption of the arbitration agreement, the
court should approve its rejection.
139. In a chapter 11 proceeding the court appoints a creditors' committee
which usually consists of the holders of the seven largest claims against the
debtor. 11 U.S.C. § 1102 (Supp. IV 1980). This committee can play an active role
in the case, especially in the negotiation of a plan. Id. § 1103.
140. Before a plan may be confirmed, it must be accepted by a majority (as
defined by the Code) of creditors of each class, with certain exceptions. See id.
§§ 1126, 1129(b).
141. Once again the example is far too simple. The creditors' committee po-
sition may be only a bluff and in a real case the number of variables will be far





In addition to relative cost and delay, the trustee might ar-
gue as a ground for rejection that regardless of the debtor's
bankruptcy, the arbitration agreement is unenforceable under
the U.N. Convention and the F.A.A. because of the unenforce-
ability of any award resulting therefrom.142 Although this issue
actually involves enforcement, not rejection, it is likely to come
up at the same time. The bankruptcy court must determine
whether the unenforceability of any award resulting from arbi-
142. Article 11(1) of the U.N. Convention requires each signatory country to
"recognize" arbitration agreements that are in writing. This has led some to
argue that the Convention does not require signatory countries to "enforce"
agreements as it requires with respect to arbitral awards. Hence, according to
these commentators, signatory states are under no obligation to enforce such
agreements specifically. See, e.g., Quigley, supra note 76, at 1063-64. Section 206
of the F.A., however, does grant U.S. district courts the power to compel a
party to arbitrate in accordance with its agreement. 9 U.S.C. § 206 (Supp. IV
1980). Moreover, article 11(3) commands a court of a signatory state seized of
an action subject to an arbitration agreement to refer the parties to arbitration
"unless it finds that the said agreement is null and void, inoperative or incapa-
ble of being performed." U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. II, para. 3.
The failure specifically to link nonenforcement of agreements in article II
to the grounds for nonenforcement of awards in article V suggests that there
might be some agreements that are enforceable notwithstanding the nonen-
forceability of any award resulting therefrom and vice versa. One can certainly
argue that the Conference did not intend the specific standards of articles II
and V to be perfectly symmetrical, because drafts expressly linking the two ar-
ticles were proposed and defeated. U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 26/SRL21, ICA-Conven-
tion, supra note 72, at C.198-200. Compare U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 26/C.3/L.3, ICA-
Convention, supra note 72, at B.7.1 (June 5, 1958) (Belgian proposal) and U.N.
Doc. E/CONF.26/L.52, ICA-Convention, supra note 72, at B.6.1 (Working Party
Draft) with U.N. Convention, supra note 5, arts. II and V (language adopted
from the proposals to draft article II was less in accordance with the language
of article V than the unadopted language. The unadopted proposal, the Work-
ing Party Draft, would have added limitations to article II similar to those in
article V). Yet several opponents of the defeated provisions agreed that the
problem of incongruity between the articles should be resolved, and two
amendments were offered by the delegate of the United Kingdom specifically
for that purpose. The adoption of both amendments suggests that the Confer-
ence wanted to reconcile the incongruity between the two articles. U.N. Doc.
E/CONF. 26/SR.21, ICA-Convention, supra note 72, at C. 198, 200. One of these
two amendments was later dropped, but for unrelated reasons. U.N. Doc.
E/CONF. 26/SR.24, ICA-Convention, supra note 72, at C. 221-22 (June 10, 1958).
The reader's overall impression of the Convention's history in this respect is
one of confusion, which the text of the Convention itself has nicely captured.
In light of this history, courts should adopt the common sense notion that
agreements should not be enforced under article 11 if an award based on that
agreement would not be enforceable under article V. Thus, the more reason-
able interpretation of the phrase "unless it finds that the said agreement is null
and void, inoperative or incapable of being performed" is that an agreement is




tration is an issue which it should decide at the time prelimi-
nary approval of arbitration is being sought.
As has been pointed out, the F.A.A. permits the U.S. courts
to deny enforcement only if one of the grounds for nonenforce-
ment specified in the Convention applies.143 As discussed ear-
lier, that the Convention authorizes the enforcing state to deny
enforcement on public policy grounds,144 which in the United
States are to be strictly limited,145 or if the subject matter of
the dispute is not arbitrable under the law of the enforcing
state,146 an exception that also would appear to have very lim-
ited applicability in the United States after Scherk.14 7 Other-
wise, the opponent of enforcement must prove that one of the
five remaining grounds for nonenforcement under the Conven-
tion applies. Only one of these five bases for nonenforcement
is susceptible of determination by the bankruptcy court at the
time approval is sought.
The first of the grounds for nonenforcement actually states
two separate defenses: that a party was subject to an incapac-
ity; or that the agreement to arbitrate is not valid under the law
chosen by the parties in their agreement or, absent a choice by
the parties, under the law of the place where the award was
made.148 This Article has already discussed the meaning of the
incapacity defense in the context of bankruptcy.149 The other
defense, the validity of the parties' arbitration agreement, obvi-
ously need not await the completion of the arbitration proceed-
ing and could be resolved prior to the arbitration.
The second basis for nonenforcement under the Conven-
tion is that the party against whom enforcement is sought did
not receive proper notice of the arbitration proceeding or was
"otherwise unable to present his case."1 5 0 This ground coupled
with the third ground listed in article V(1) (d), requiring that
the procedure employed by the arbitral tribunal be in accord-
ance with the parties' agreement or the law of the arbitral tri-
bunal, creates what may be called a due process exception.'15
Whether a party to an arbitral proceeding has received due pro-
143. See supra text accompanying note 68.
144. See supra text accompanying note 69.
145. See supra text accompanying note 70.
146. See supra text accompanying note 71.
147. See supra text accompanying notes 79-83.
148. U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. V, para. 1(a).
149. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
150. U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. V, para. l(b).
151. See Quigley, supra note 76, at 1068.
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cess cannot ordinarily be determined until after the the pro-
ceeding is completed.
The same can be said about the fourth and fifth exceptions.
The fourth exception permits nonenforcement if the award ex-
ceeds the scope of the parties' submission to arbitration. 5 2 A
court cannot decide the applicability of this exception until the
parties can produce an award from a completed arbitration pro-
ceeding. The fifth exception clearly presupposes that an award
is already in existence at the time enforceability is determined
since it excuses enforcement if the award is not yet binding or
has been set aside by a jurisdiction under whose laws the
award was made or in which the arbitration took place.153
Thus, in the usual case the only issue that could be enter-
tained at the approval stage is whether the arbitration agree-
ment is valid under the law applicable to the agreement. This
issue should be for the arbitral tribunal to determine in the
first instance, unless the nonbankrupt party is subject to suit in
the United States in connection with the underlying
transaction.
If the nonbankrupt party could have been sued by the
debtor in this country, then the debtor could have forced the
arbitration issue by filing such a suit. The nonbankrupt party
would have been compelled to defend by asserting the arbitra-
tion clause as the basis for a stay. 54 The debtor would then
have had the opportunity to assert the invalidity of the arbitra-
tion clause. Under these circumstances, the arbitration agree-
ment is subject to two attacks in the United States--one before
and one after arbitration-even absent the bankruptcy of the
debtor. Arguably, the trustee is not unfairly advantaged if af-
forded the same opportunity in the bankruptcy court.
If, on the other hand, the nonbankrupt party does not have
sufficient contacts with the United States to permit such a suit,
the debtor, absent the filing of a bankruptcy petition, would not
have been able to test the validity of the arbitration agreement
in the U.S. courts prior to arbitration. Given the strong U.S.
policy in favor of international arbitration, the advantages it
confers on the foreign party ought not to be diminished in
bankruptcy except to the extent absolutely necessary to pro-
tect fundamental bankruptcy policies. Only in an unusual
152. U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. V, para. 1(c).
153. Id. art. V, para. 1(e).
154. 9 U.S.C. § 3 (Supp. IV 1980).
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case 55 should the trustee occupy a more favorable position
than the debtor would have occupied.
The world of commerce will no doubt produce other in-
stances in which bankruptcy approval of a trustee's rejection of
an arbitration agreement would be appropriate. On the basis of
the above, however, it would seem that only relatively narrow
and unusual circumstances would justify refusal to require a
trustee to honor the debtor's international arbitration
agreement.
C. CAN THE TRUSTEE BE REQUIRED TO ARBITRATE A CAUSE OF
ACTION DERIVED FROM CREDITORS?
To this point the discussion has concerned arbitration of
claims and counterclaims that the trustee will defend and as-
sert in the trustee's capacity as successor of the debtor. Rights
asserted by the trustee in the trustee's capacity as representa-
tive of the debtor's creditors require separate consideration.
One claim within this special category has come before the
courts in the domestic arbitration context-a trustee's suit to
avoid a fraudulent conveyance made to a creditor and to re-
cover the property so conveyed or its value. 156 In Allegaert v.
Perot, 157 the trustee alleged causes of action against certain in-
siders under the federal securities laws, the Bankruptcy Code,
and state law. The defendants sought arbitration of all these
claims pursuant to arbitration clauses in an underlying con-
tract and in accordance with the rules of the New York and
American stock exchanges, but the court denied arbitration of
155. There might be a case in which the cost of arbitration would substan-
tially diminish the recoveries of unsecured creditors and the trustee could
make a very powerful showing of the invalidity of the arbitration agreement on
the undisputed facts. In that unusual situation, a threshold attack on the
agreement should be permitted, since the foreign party's award will very likely
be of no value in bankruptcy and everyone will be hurt by a pointless
arbitration.
156. In general terms, a fraudulent conveyance is a transfer of property
with an actual intent to defraud creditors or under circumstances statutorily
defined as avoidable regardless of intent. The most common example of an
avoidable fraudulent conveyance is a transfer in exchange for less than a rea-
sonably equivalent value when the transferor was insolvent or was rendered in-
solvent by the transfer. Such transfers can be voided by creditors of the
transferor under state law. E.g., UNIFoRM FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCE ACT § 4, 7A
U.L.A. (1980). The trustee can avoid a fraudulent conveyance under either
state or federal law. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (Supp. IV 1980) (trustee may
avoid any transfer incurred by debtor voidable under applicable state law) with
11 U.S.C. § 548 (Supp. IV 1980) (trustee may avoid any transfer fraudulently
incurred).
157. 548 F.2d 432 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977).
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both the securities and bankruptcy claims.158 The court noted
that the trustee's allegations that certain of the debtor's trans-
fers were fraudulent could not have been asserted by the
debtor and therefore did not derive from any cause of action
possessed by the debtor.15 9 Instead, such claims are derived
from rights of the debtor's creditors to attack such conveyances
prior to the debtor's bankruptcy. Since the trustee as to these
claims was a representative of creditors who had never agreed
to arbitration,160 the court held that the arbitration agreements
could not be enforced against the trustee. This aspect of Perot
seems entirely sound since it is well-settled that arbitration
agreements bind only those who have assented to them and
their successors.161
A typical situation in which the fraudulent conveyance is-
sue might arise would be a contract containing an arbitration
provision between Debtor and Transferee in which Debtor
agrees to exchange an office building for Transferee's shares of
stock in Overvalued corporation. Debtor subsequently discov-
ers that Overvalued corporation stock is worth substantially
less than Transferee represented and also substantially less
than the value of the office building Debtor gave in exchange.
Because of the stock's low value, Debtor is rendered insolvent
by the transaction and thereafter goes into bankruptcy.
Against this transaction, Debtor's trustee in bankruptcy might
assert breach of contract, common law fraud, securities fraud,
and a fraudulent conveyance as grounds for avoiding the trans-
fer.162 The first two causes of action would normally be subject
to the arbitration clause, while the securities claim would be
exempt from arbitration under U.S. law. On the basis of Perot,
the fraudulent conveyance claims would also appear to be ex-
empt from arbitration.
If this were an international transaction, the result should
be different for the securities claim, but not for the fraudulent
conveyance claim. The Scherk exception would require that
the securities claim be submitted to arbitration pursuant to the
158. The securities claims were not arbitrable under the rule of Wilko v.
Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir.) rev'd, 346 U.S. 427 (1953). 548 F.2d at 436-38.
See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
159. Id. at 436-37.
160. Id. at 436.
161. E.g., Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 35 A.D.2d 469, 471-
72, 318 N.Y.S.2d 764, 766-67 (1st Dept. 1971). See M. DomKE, supra note 86, ch.
10, at 78.




parties' agreement.163 The fraudulent conveyance action is dif-
ferent. Given that neither Debtor's trustee nor Debtor's credi-
tors, to whom the fraudulent conveyance action exclusively
belongs, were parties to the arbitration agreement, they cannot
be compelled to arbitrate that which they never agreed to
arbitrate.
It might seem that the assertion of a fraudulent convey-
ance on the facts assumed is merely a different theory for at-
tacking the same transaction and arguably just the kind of end-
run forbidden by Scherk. In fact there is a difference. The
fraudulent conveyance claim is not merely another theory, but
an independent cause of action asserted by a third party. The
trustee inherited the other claims from the debtor burdened by
the latter's agreement to arbitrate; the trustee brings the fraud-
ulent conveyance action as representative of the debtor's credi-
tors. Moreover, a court would not order a creditor to arbitrate a
fraudulent conveyance action brought under the Uniform
Fraudulent Conveyance Act. Because the trustee is merely act-
ing as the representative of such a creditor in an action to avoid
a fraudulent transfer under the Code, the trustee should simi-
larly be free of any obligation to arbitrate. 6 4
A similar analysis might be made under section 544(a) of
the Code, which grants the trustee the status of a lien creditor
under state law.165 This provision enables the trustee to chal-
lenge the validity of certain transfers, liens, or encumbrances
just as if the trustee had been a creditor of the debtor who, as
of the commencement of the case, had perfected a judicial lien
on the debtor's property.166 An example in which the trustee
might use the avoidance power of section 544 would be a con-
tract between a debtor and a foreign party containing both an
arbitration clause and a clause giving the foreign party a secur-
ity interest in the debtor's assets to secure the debtor's per-
formance of its contractual obligations. If, after the debtor's
bankruptcy, disputes arise concerning the debtor's perform-
ance of the contract and the validity of the foreign party's se-
curity interest, the foreign party's contract claims should
163. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. The number of "interna-
tional" contacts required to trigger Scherk is not entirely clear. See Scherk v.
Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 n.11 (1974).
164. In the oft-quoted words of the Eighth Circuit: "While it is unquestiona-
bly true that the trustee stood in the shoes of the bankrupt, it is equally true
that he stood inthe overshoes of the creditors ..... " Schneider v. O'Neal, 243
F.2d 914, 918 (8th Cir. 1957).
165. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (Supp. IV 1980).
166. 4 COLLIER (15th), supra note 88, 544.02.
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generally be resolved in arbitration; however, the validity or
priority of the foreign party's lien, if attacked by the trustee,
should be determined by the bankruptcy court. The trustee de-
fends against the contract claim as successor to the debtor's as-
sets, but attacks the validity of a lien as a representative of the
debtor's creditors who never agreed to the arbitration clause.167
From the foregoing it seems clear that there are certain
claims by a trustee, those derived from the rights of creditors,
which should not be subject to the debtor's arbitration agree-
ment, even in connection with a transnational transaction. The
result urged here is not inconsistent with the U.N. Convention
nor the F.A., since the Convention does not contemplate en-
forcement of arbitration agreements against parties who have
not agreed to arbitrate.168
IV. THE EFFECT OF PREPETITION AWARDS
A. UNCONFIRMED AWARDS
If an arbitral award is made prior to bankruptcy but has
not been reduced to judgment in either the United States or
elsewhere, does the bankruptcy court have the power to refuse
enforcement of the award? Under the F.AA., this question
must be answered by reference to the U.N. Convention. 69 Arti-
167. Whether the litigation should actually proceed on two different tracks
is another question. The procedural disposition of multi-claim actions, in which
some claims clearly are not subject to arbitration, while others are in the dis-
cretionary zone discussed above, is beyond the scope of this Article. In Alle-
gaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 438 (2d Cir. 1977), the court stayed litigation of the
state law claims pending resolution of the nonarbitrable federal claims. Accord
Lee v. Ply*Gen Industries, Inc., 593 F.2d 1266, 1275 (D.C. Cir. 1979); Sibley v.
Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540, 544 (5th Cir. 1976), reh'g denied, 547 F.2d 286, 287, cert
denied, 434 U.S. 824 (1977); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Co., 444 F. Supp. 68, 71 (S.D.N.Y.
1977); Shapiro v. Jaslow, 320 F. Supp. 598, 600 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). Query if it would
not make more sense to adjudicate all claims together which are factually "in-
tertwined." See Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318, 336 (5th Cir. 1981). If
so, the forum chosen should be the one appropriate for the claims which
"predominate." Cf. Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d at 543 (federal claim "de-
pendent" on state arbitration claim); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 444 F. Supp. at 70
(federal claim predominates).
168. See U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. V, para. 1(c); Quigley, supra
note 76, at 1067.
169. The only grounds on which a U.S. court may refuse enforcement of a
foreign arbitral award falling under the Convention are those specified in arti-
cle V of the Convention itself. 9 U.S.C. § 201 (1976). A prepetition award ren-
dered in a country which has not acceded to the Convention raises different
considerations. The U.S. courts have no obligation to enforce such awards, and
the default risks are substantial. On the other hand, Scherk was decided as a
pre-Convention case and the policies it announced would call for enforcement.
See supra notes 79-83 and accompanying text. An accommodation might be
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cle V of the Convention appears to permit the enforcing State
to refuse enforcement "if the award is not yet binding."7o Al-
though the conference records are unclear regarding the mean-
ing of "binding,"l71 most commentators agree that it does not
mean that the losing party can insist on reduction of the award
to judgment in the rendering state as a condition to recognition
in the enforcing state. 7 2 Any other interpretation of this provi-
sion would have the untoward effect of reinstating the problem
of the "double exequatur,"1 73 the elimination of which was a
goal of many supporters of the Convention. That the Conven-
tion does in fact eliminate the "double exequatur" is confirmed
by article IV, which requires that the winning party need sub-
mit only a certified copy of the award and arbitration agree-
ment as a prerequisite to enforcement in a nonrendering state.
Prepetition awards, therefore, must be enforced in bankruptcy,
even if not reduced to judgment, unless the court finds another
basis in article V of the Convention to deny enforcement.
Moreover, the court cannot rely on the bankruptcy of the
debtor to refuse enforcement under article V(l) (a), as it could
with respect to postpetition awards, 7 4 since the debtor would
not have been bankrupt at the time of the prepetition award.
B. CONFIRMED AwARDs
It is possible that an award might be confirmed prior to
bankruptcy by a foreign or by a U.S. judgment. Although un-
confirmed awards are generally enforceable under the Conven-
tion, the impact of confirmation by judgment could be
significant. If the judgment must be respected, the Conven-
tion's defenses would not be available, and the only defenses
the trustee could assert would be those provided by state law,
such as the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act17 5
made by permitting relitigation, but with some presumptions in favor of the
award. See, e.g., infra note 179 and accompanying text.
170. U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. V, para. 1(e).
171. See, e.g., Note by Secretary General, U.N. Doc. E/CONF. 26/2, ICA-Con-
vention, supra note 72, at A.4.1, para. 15-21; E/CONF. 26/SR.17 (Sept. 12, 1958),
ICA-Convention, supra note 72, at C.135-48.
172. See, e.g., Contini, supra note 73, at 303-04; Domke, supra note 31, at 579;
Springer, The United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement
of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 3 INT'L LAw. 320, 324 (1969).
173. The "double exequatur" refers to the requirement that an arbitral
award first be reduced to judgment in the rendering state as a condition to ob-
taining a judgment on the award in an enforcing state.
174. See supra text accompanying notes 72-76.




or the common law of foreign judgment recognition. If, on the
other hand, the judgment could be ignored, not only could the
trustee assert against the underlying award the defenses avail-
able under the Convention, but, if successful, the trustee could
relitigate the merits.
1. U.S. Judgments
It seems that an award reduced to a U.S. judgment prior to
the debtor's petition in bankruptcy must be considered conclu-
sive in the U.S. courts, including the bankruptcy court. The
reader might have observed that the policies underlying the
nullification rule would seem to call for a different result, since
there is a substantial risk that prepetition judgments could
have been obtained without an adequate defense by the debtor.
Indeed, these policies would suggest nullification of all judg-
ments obtained within some "suspect period" prior to bank-
ruptcy. Nevertheless, history has yielded a different result.
Under the former Act, prepetition judgments were conclusive
in bankruptcy, and there is no reason to think the law has been
changed by the Code.176
2. Foreign Judgments
Outside bankruptcy a good case can be made that a con-
firming foreign judgment should be enforced, and relitigation of
the Convention's defenses precluded, if the requirements of
state law177 concerning enforcement of foreign judgments are
met.178 In such circumstances, the award debtor likely will
176. 3A COLLIER (14th), supra note 28, 63.10-.11. This rule developed under
section 63(a) (1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1976) (repealed
1978), which made a prepetition judgment a provable claim. This provision has
been dropped from the Code, together with the whole concept of "provability."
Commission Bill, supra note 28, § 4-403 n.2. There is nothing in the legislative
history of the Code, however, to suggest that the long-standing "finality" doc-
trine was meant to be changed.
177. The Uniform Act would permit the debtor to assert lack of personal ju-
risdiction or a severely inconvenient forum. UNIF. ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN
JUDGMENTs ACT (1948 Act) § 8, 13 U.LA. 190 (1980). These assertions would of
course carry little weight as to a judgment of the state rendering the arbitration
award, since the debtor had accepted that state for arbitration.
178. It could be argued that the need for uniform results under the Conven-
tion requires a federal rule, and therefore state judgment enforcement law
should not control. While a good case can be made for a federal rule governing
enforcement of all foreign judgments, there is no evident reason for a special
rule with regard to judgments confirming awards, especially if the result is
greater difficulty in enforcing the award. If the state would make the judgment
conclusive, it should be enforced. If not, the F.A.A. will govern enforcement of
the underlying award. Any notions of "merger" which would make confirmed
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have had a fair opportunity to assert any of the Convention's
defenses in a court of competent jurisdiction. The only defense
that the award debtor might not have had available is that of
U.S. public policy. Yet any judgment confirming, for example,
an award of a pound of flesh would itself violate U.S. public pol-
icy and would not be enforced, so that invocation of the Con-
vention's defenses to enforcing the foreign judgment in the
United States would not be necessary to protect U.S. policy.
Even if the award debtor did not have an opportunity to lit-
igate the Convention's defenses (for example, because the con-
firming court held the arbitration to be "domestic" and
therefore not covered by the Convention), the judgment should
be enforced. The plaintiff, in such a case, is not invoking the
Convention in seeking enforcement, and therefore the Conven-
tion's defenses should not be available to the award debtor,
leaving both parties exactly as they would have been if the
Convention did not exist. A contrary result would require the
conclusion that the Convention was intended to become the ex-
clusive method of enforcing rights subject to arbitration there-
under. The Convention states the contrary on its face.179
If enforcement is sought in a bankruptcy proceeding, the
nullification policies of bankruptcy law might suggest a differ-
ent result. In addition, one might observe that the Convention
requires enforcement of foreign awards, not foreign judgments.
On the other hand, state judgment recognition law, the analogy
to U.S. judgments, and the policy against relitigation would all
support enforcement of a foreign award reduced to judgment in
a foreign state prior to the bankruptcy filing. One rule that
commends itself in such circumstances is that a prepetition for-
eign judgment, which would be enforceable absent bankruptcy,
places a burden on the trustee to convince the bankruptcy
court not only of the existence of a defense to enforcement of
the underlying award under the Convention, but also that there
is a substantial likelihood of a materially different result if the
merits are relitigated in the bankruptcy court.180
awards less enforceable than unconfirmed ones should be dismissed out of
hand as form over substance. See Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512,
517 (2d Cir. 1975).
179. U.N. Convention, supra note 5, art. VII, para. 1.
180. This result would be neatly analogous to the situation in which a jury
verdict, but not a judgment thereon, is obtained before bankruptcy. There the
verdict is not conclusive, as the judgment would have been, but it is entitled to
great weight in the bankruptcy court's determination of the extent to which the




A different problem would be presented by a foreign judg-
ment obtained after bankruptcy on an award made before the
petition was filed.181 It will be recalled that the Fotochrome
court refused enforcement of such a judgment, although with
no clear rationale. The Fotochrome result seems correct in this
respect. That is, postpetition foreign judgments should be ig-
nored unless the foreign proceeding in which the judgment was
rendered had received the prior approval of the bankruptcy
court. Unapproved postpetition state court proceedings are not
recognized, and there is no reason to give foreign judgments
any greater deference as long as the policies underlying the au-
tomatic stay and the nullification rule apply equally to domes-
tic and foreign postpetition proceedings. In effect, therefore,
prepetition awards reduced to judgment in an unapproved for-
eign proceeding after bankruptcy filing should be treated as un-
confirmed awards.
If, after bankruptcy, the foreign party seeks bankruptcy
court approval to confirm a prepetition award in a foreign court,
the issue becomes more difficult. The effect of granting permis-
sion would be to require the trustee to assert the Convention's
defenses in a foreign court, and to preclude relitigation of those
defenses when the foreign judgment is later filed with the
claimant's proof of claim in bankruptcy. The nullification poli-
cies would be largely satisfied, since the court could protect
against default, and it could be argued on behalf of the foreign
party that it might be prejudiced by having to litigate the de-
fenses in the United States contrary to the expectations of the
parties. Nonetheless, there are no treaties or commercial poli-
cies strongly supporting the enforcement of the creditor's
prebankruptcy expectations about court proceedings, and the
bankruptcy policies of expedition and economy surely must
control. These policies require that litigation of defenses to the
award be conducted in the bankruptcy court.182
181. Obviously, a postpetition U.S. judgment confirming an award would be
barred by the automatic stay and would in any case be void. See supra note 30
and accompanying text.
182. It could be argued that an arbitration clause operates implicitly as a
choice of forum clause, designating the courts of the place of arbitration as a
proper forum for confirmation of the award. The argument could then be made
that important U.S. commercial policies support enforcement of the forum
clause. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1 (1972). The argu-
ment would be reinforced by the fact that arbitration clauses and forum
clauses have similar purposes and effects. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417
U.S. 506, 518-19 (1974). The first response must be that no treaty obligation
compels enforcement of forum clauses. Even more important is the fact that




The above analysis is very technical; yet, it may suggest
several larger points regarding the role of national courts in
transnational commercial disputes. The central policy proposi-
tions are that U.S. bankruptcy courts should boldly assert their
jurisdiction over the issue of arbitration vel non whenever a
sensible choice of law rule would select the United States as
the primary bankruptcy jurisdiction for a particular debtor183
sonable. Zapata, 407 U.S. at 10. No such limitation applies to arbitration
clauses. When a trustee argues that it would be highly unreasonable to require
foreign litigation over the award, the trustee should prevail.
183. For discussion of these questions, see generally Becker, Letter-Reha-
bilitating International Bankruptcy Law: Lessons Taught by Herstatt and Co.,
52 N.Y.U. L. REV. 726 (1977); Honsberger, Conflict of Laws and the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, 30 CASE W.L. REV. 631 (1980); Nadelmann, Assumption of
Bankruptcy Jurisdiction Over Non-Residents, 41 TULANE L REV. 75 (1966);
Nadelmann, Codification, supra note 65; Nadelmann, The National Bankruptcy
Act and the Conflict of Laws, 59 HARv. L. REV. 1025 (1946); Nadelmann, Rehabil-
itating International Bankruptcy Law: Lessons Taught by Herstatt and Co., 52
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (1977); Nadelmann, Revision of Conflicts Provisions in the
American Bankruptcy Act, 1 INT'L COMP. L.Q. 484 (1952) [hereinafter cited as
Nadelmann, Revision].
It appears that Congress intended to give the U.S. bankruptcy courts
world-wide jurisdiction over property of a U.S. debtor when it used the phrase
"wherever located." 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e) (Supp. IV 1980). See Nadelmann, Revi-
sion, supra, at 486. If an international system of orderly bankruptcy adminis-
tration is ever to be achieved, it may be that the court which has the greatest
connection with the debtor and its affairs should assert broad jurisdiction, at
least hoping that other courts may defer. The United States has taken a step in
the obverse direction under the new Code. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 304, 306 (Supp. IV
1980). While affirmative steps toward cooperation may be useful, some asser-
tive actions may also stimulate international cooperation. Cf. Hearings, supra
note 65, at 1442-51 (testimony of Professor Nadelmann discussing the negative
effect on international relations proposed changes in the Bankruptcy Code
could have, and proposing ways to enhance cooperation with foreign parties to
bankruptcy).
It seems to the author that no advance can be achieved in international co-
operation if some assertion of worldwide jurisdiction is not made. A denial of
jurisdiction, Fotochrome being an extreme example, leaves a foreign court
which is inclined to comity with nothing to which it can defer. Imagine a U.S.
debtor with an English establishment which is current on its English debts at
the time of the debtor's U.S. bankruptcy. Under the circumstances, the English
court may well be inclined to defer to the U.S. bankruptcy court. See
Nadelmann, Codification, supra note 65, at 1485-86. Suppose further that a
French arbitration award is entered against the debtor after bankruptcy and an
enforcement proceeding in England seeks an English judgment on the award
and seizure of the debtor's English assets in satisfaction. If the view of U.S. ju-
risdiction suggested by Fotochrome is accepted, the English court may be help-
less. If the nullification rule is applied in U.S. courts and if those courts make it
clear that they want to apply the rule to overseas assets to the extent the
"power" of comity permits, the English court could declare the award unen-
forceable under the choice-of-law provisions of the U.N. Convention.
One analogy here is the world-wide jurisdiction said to rest in the courts of
a decedent's domicile as to all his personal property. RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
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but, having asserted jurisdiction, the bankruptcy courts should
generally enforce international arbitration agreements. The al-
ternative is legal chaos or, at least, incoherence. If our national
courts will not fashion sensible rules about the role of interna-
tional arbitration in the extraordinary circumstances of bank-
ruptcy, can we expect foreign courts to do so? Even if the
nonbankruptcy courts of each place of arbitration do assume
this burden, they are not as well suited as the bankruptcy
courts of the debtor's domicile to adapt an international arbi-
tration agreement to the special circumstances of bankruptcy.
Under the best of circumstances, the adoption of varying rules
by each judicial system having territorial jurisdiction of a par-
ticular arbitration will hardly serve the goals of predictability
and consistency so essential to any international business
transaction.
The same problems plague many other aspects of transna-
tional litigation. The general suggestion is that comity and co-
herence in international commercial relationships will not be
achieved by a reflexive refusal to get involved. Only a power
which has been asserted can then defer to international
cooperation.
We live in a transitional age in which legal principles lag
far behind the on-rushing internationalization of commerce.
We must rely for now on national legal systems as the primary
vehicle for the enforcement of legitimate commercial expecta-
tions.184 Unless the courts of each nation are willing to assert
jurisdiction and then defer when appropriate to international
legal principles, parties will be left with erratic enforcement or
no enforcement at all. The absence of enforceable expectations
is the worst possible environment for commerce, especially
OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 317 and comment b (1969). The Restatement asserts
that other courts should enforce the orders of the domiciliary court if the other
courts' choice-of-law rules point to that jurisdiction as being appropriate for the
probate proceedings. Id.
It may be that only treaties will eventually provide a solution to the inter-
national bankruptcy conundrum. See Hearings, supra note 65, at 1444 (testi-
mony of Professor Nadelmann). On the other hand, creative, practical action
by the courts is often a necessary stimulant to legislative and diplomatic action.
184. It is true, and of the greatest significance, that there is a rapid growth
of truly international business and commercial law or proto-law. See, e.g., Draft
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 33 U.N. GAOR
UNCITAL Supp. (No. 17) at 30, U.N. Doc A/13/17 (1978), 18 LL.M. 639-66 (1979);
Baade, The Legal Effects of Codes of Conduct for Multinational Enterprises, in
LEGAL PROBLEMS OF CODES OF CONDUCT FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 3 (N.
Horn ed. 1980). See generally Decisions (1975-1979) of the ICC Banking Corn-
mission (International Chamber of Commerce 1980). Nonetheless, these rules
remain dependent on national courts for their enforcement.
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that commerce which must leap the walls of cultural and polit-
ical differences. 8 5
The creation within national legal systems of sound legal
principles to govern international commerce is difficult. It
takes, in particular, hard-working and courageous judges to fol-
low a course both assertive and cooperative. Yet the effort
should commend itself. If the flow of international commerce
may create channels through which law may follow, if the
chains of self-interest forged by commerce may restrain the
blows too often commanded by politics or religion or ideology,
then the lawyers and judges who fashion the law of interna-
tional commerce may claim some contribution to a larger and
better future.
185. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516 (1974).
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